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COMMENTS

THE FUTURE OF LABOR-MANAGEMENT
COOPERATION FOLLOWING ELECTROMATION
AND E.L DU PONT

I.

INTRODUCTION

In an increasingly competitive and global marketplace,
traditional adversaries are finding it advisable to realign
their allegiances to achieve common goals. This is also true
of labor-management relations. Employers and employees
have increasingly recognized the need to work together to increase productivity and quality for the company, thus improving quality of life for the employees.' The usual, and
most problematic, form of the resulting labor-management
cooperation efforts are committees involving employees which
provide management with their expertise and perspective on
various workplace issues.2 Currently, such committees are
vulnerable to attack as unlawful labor organizations if they
are found to be dominated by the employer.
1. See BUREAU OF LABOR-MANAGEMENT RELATIONS AND COOPERATIVE PROGRAMS, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF LABOR, U.S. LABOR LAW AND THE FUTURE OF LABOR-MANAGEMENT COOPERATION 7 (1986).
2. See BARRY BLUESTONE & IRVING BLUESTONE, NEGOTIATING THE FUTURE
3 (1992). Bluestone notes several of the different types of these committees
which have developed around different theories and in divers workplaces, all of
which come under the aegis of "labor-management cooperation." Id. For the
sake of consistency and in order to focus on legal rather than business management theory, these committees will be referred to generically throughout this
Comment as labor-management cooperation efforts. For a more detailed analysis of some of the theory behind the different models of labor-management cooperation, see generally U.S. DEPT. OF LABOR, EMPLOYMENT AND TRAINING ADMINISTRATION, WORKFORCE QUALITY: PERSPECTIVES FROM THE U.S. AND JAPAN
(1990); U.S. DEPT. OF LABOR, BREAu OF LABOR-MANAGEMENT RELATIONS AND
COOPERATIVE PROGRAMS, PRODUCTIVITY AND EMPLOYMENT: CHALLENGES FOR THE
1990s (1988); WILLIAM B. GOULD IV, JAPAN'S RESHAPING OF AMERICAN LABOR

LAw (1984); ROBERT M. MARSH AND HIROSHI MANNARI, MODERNIZATION AND THE
JAPANESE FACTORY (1976); Clyde W. Summers, An American Perspective of the
German Model of Worker Participation,8 Comp. Lab. L.J. 333 (1987).
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One response to this cooperative exception to the traditional adversity between labor and management has been a
more lenient judicial interpretation of the collective set of factors that constitute unlawful employer domination or interference with the formation or administration of a labor organization under the National Labor Relations Act 3 [hereinafter
NLRA]. However, two recent National Labor Relations
Board [hereinafter NLRB] decisions appear to contradict this
nascent trend by returning to the traditional definition of unlawful domination. These two cases, Electromation,Inc.4 and

E.L du Pont de Nemours & Co.,5 pose a challenge not only to
a developing doctrine, but also to a now widely acknowledged
business necessity.
Approximately 14% of all corporations, and 33% of all
corporations with 500 or more employees, had instituted labor-management cooperation efforts by 1982.6 A 1991 survey
indicated widespread recognition of the advantages of labormanagement cooperation efforts in the workplace. 7 In 1993,
two bills presented to Congress revealed that 80% of the largest businesses in the United States, constituting 30,000
workplaces, had "employee involvement structures."8 Further, in June 1994, the Commission on the Future of WorkerManagement Relations issued an interim report finding that
labor-management cooperation efforts affect between onefifth and one-third of the workforce today. 9 In several wellpublicized cases, significantly beneficial results for both the
company and its employees have been attributed to these pro-

3. 29 U.S.C. §§ 151-69 (1988). See specifically 29 U.S.C. §§ 152(5),
158(a)(2) (1988).
4. 309 N.L.R.B. 990 (1992), enforced, Electromation, Inc. v. NLRB, 1994
U.S. App. LEXIS 25612 (7th Cir. Sept. 15, 1994).
5. 311 N.L.R.B. 893 (1993).
6. See OFFICE OF ECONOMIC RESEARCH, NEW YORK STOCK EXCHANGE, PEOPLE AND PRODUCTIVITY: A CHALLENGE TO CORPORATE AMERICA 23-24 (1982).
7. See generally Brian S. Moskal, Is Industry Ready for Adult Relationships?, INDUSTRY WK., Jan. 21, 1991, at 18. The advantages accrue to employers through better quality, productivity and customer service as well as to employees through greater involvement in the management of the company and
the concomitant increase in control over their own destiny. Id. at 22.
8. S.669, 103d Cong., 1st Sess. § 2(a)(3) (1993); H.R. 1529, 103d Cong., 1st
Sess. § 2(a)(3) (1993).
9. See U.S. DEPr. OF LABOR, COMMISSION ON THE FUTURE OF WORKER-MANAGEMENT RELATIONS, INTERIM FACT FINDING REPORT (1994).
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grams. 10 The Department of Labor has acknowledged this
trend and "taken a strong position in support of labor-management cooperation as an important prerequisite to
1
America's return to preeminence in the world marketplace." '
Secretary of Labor, Robert Reich, is also an advocate of labormanagement cooperation programs, despite the Clinton administration's general sympathy and support for the union
of
perspective which has always been generally suspicious
2
cooperation.'
labor-management
the motives behind
Electromationand E.I. du Pont are viewed by many management representatives as a major impediment to the labormanagement cooperation now widely accepted as a require-3
marketplace.'
ment for successful competition in the global
Faced with the fact-dependent and ambiguous Electromation
and E.I. du Pont standards, companies tend to either eliminate all labor-management committees to avoid litigation, de10. See generally WILLIAM B. GOULD IV, AGENDA FOR REFORM 123-31 (1993)

(discussing the labor-management cooperation at the General Motors-Toyota
joint venture and at the Saturn Corporation); BLUESTONE & BLUESTONE, supra
note 2, at 174-79 (discussing labor-management cooperation case studies at
Corning Glass, Ford, Campbell Soup, Northern Telecom, A.O. Smith, and the
New York City Department of Sanitation); Bill Childs, New United Motor: An
American Success Story, 40 LAB. L.J. 453 (1989); Scott Kafker, Exploring Saturn: An Examination of the Philosophy of "Total"Labor-Management Cooperation and the Limitations Presented by the NLRA, 5 LAB. LAW. 703 (1989);
Speech by Jerry Lewis & Ernie Schaefer, Using Employee Input from Nuts to
Bolts in Building a Newly-Designed Car: The Fiero People Story, in SELECTIONS
63 (Bureau of
FROM THE SECOND NATIONAL LABOR MANAGEMENT CONFERENCE
of Labor)
Dept.
U.S.
Programs,
Cooperative
Labor-Management Relations and
(1985).
11. See BUREAU OF LABOR-MANAGEMENT RELATIONS AND COOPERATIVE PROOF LAGRAMS, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF LABOR, U.S. LABOR LAW AND THE FUTURE
not
does
Bureau
the
Unfortunately,
(1986).
BOR-MANAGEMENT COOPERATION 2

reach a conclusion regarding the means to resolve the conflict between labormanagement cooperation and the traditionally adversarial employer-employee
relationship under the NLRA. See also Joy K Reynolds, A Perspective on the
Electromation Case From the U.S. Department of Labor, 43 LAB. L.J. 397, 397
(1992) ("We believe that such joint efforts on the part of workers and employers
offer the best hope for improving the competitiveness of U.S. companies.").
12. Robert Reich, The "PronounTest" for Success, WASH. POST, July 28,
1993, at A19 (describing with approval labor-management cooperation efforts
at various businesses). The Clinton administration sanctions legislation which
would prohibit employers from replacing striking workers, a stance which some
believe is contradictory to the promotion of labor-management cooperation, "by
diminishing incentives for labor and management to resolve their differences
[which] will promote labor disputes and workplace discord." 139 CONG. REC.
S9436 (daily ed. July 26, 1993) (statement of Sen. Kassebaum to President Clinton regarding S.55).
13. See Randall Samborn, Quality Survives, NAT'L L.J., July 26, 1993, at 31.
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spite their beneficial value, or to flout these standards altogether and continue to encourage labor-management
cooperation efforts despite the prospect of litigation. 4 Obviously, a less equivocal standard is needed.
This comment examines the current standards and opposing perspectives on the problem of labor-management cooperation and supports a legislative amendment to section
8(a)(2) of the NLRA. Part II reviews the legislative background 5 and judicial and agency interpretations of the provision, 16 including the developments in Electromation and E.L
du Pont.' 7 Part III analyzes the competing theories regarding labor-management cooperation in the context of a variety
of proposals that have been offered from various quarters, including judicial resolution' and legislative resolution. 19 Part
IV analyzes a proposed legislative amendment that would encompass the concerns of the unions, as well as employees and
employers.2 °
II.

BACKGROUND

A.

Overview
Unions historically oppose the trend towards labor-management cooperation efforts because it appears not only to
pose a threat to their role as the bargaining unit representative, but also seemingly contradicts traditional labor law
principles. When the NLRA was enacted in 1935,21 there was

a major concern with company-dominated unions which had
begun to appear in the early twentieth century, and which
proliferated after the enactment of the National Industrial
Recovery Act of 1933.22 Many employers created "sham"

company unions to avoid being compelled to bargain with an
14. See 139 CONG. REC. S4013 (daily ed. Mar. 3, 1993) (introductory statement of Sen. Kassebaum on joint resolution entitled Teamwork for Employees
and Management Act of 1993).
15. See infra part II.B.
16. See infra part II.C.
17. See infra part II.D.
18. See infra part III.B.
19. See infra part III.C.
20. See infra part IV.
21. 49 Stat. 449 (1935) (current version at 29 U.S.C. §§ 151-69 (1988)).
22. 78 CONG. REC. 3443 (1934) (statement of Sen. Wagner on the introduction of the NLRA bill in the Senate), reprinted in 1 NLRB, LEGISLATIVE HISTORY
OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS AcT, 1935, at 15-16 (1949) [hereinafter
LEGIS. HIST.-NLRA].
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external organization.2" The company union was perceived
as a threat to the NLRA goal of industrial peace because employer-dominated unions did not provide a meaningful oppor2 4 Congress concluded that
tunity for collective bargaining.

impartially repreemployees' best interests could only be
25
sented by an independent organization.

26
The passage of NLRA section 8(a)(2) made it an unfair
labor practice to "dominate or interfere with the formation or

section 2(5)27
administration of a labor organization." NLRA
defined a labor organization as "any organization... which
exists for the purpose, in whole or in part, of dealing with
28
employers" concerning the usual bargaining issues. These

provisions were included to ensure that employers would not
circumvent the purpose of the newly validated labor organi-

zations and upset the balance of bargaining power established by the NLRA. An employer was thus prevented from
acting as a "sham bargaining agent," obstructing organiza-

tion and bargaining efforts.
The first case decided by the NLRB addressed the issue
29
of employer-dominated labor organizations.

Since that

time, the NLRB and the courts have broadly interpreted both
the definition of a "labor organization" and the standard for

employer "domination" to restrict employer evasions of the
section 8(a)(2) prohibition against domination or interference
23. See Cox, CASES ON LABOR LAw 200-01 (11th ed. 1991). In 1935, 60% of
trade union workers were members of a company union. Douglas Zucker &
Pamela Davis-Clarke, Employer-Sponsored Programs Skirt NLRA Line, N.J.
L.J., July 5, 1993, at .10.
24. See 78 CONG. REC. 3443 (1934) (introductory statement of Sen. Wagner
observing that company unions make "a sham of equal bargaining power by

busirestricting employee cooperation to a single employer unit at a time when
LEGIS.
ness men are allowed to band together in large groups"), reprinted in 1
IST.-NLRA, supra note 22, at 15.
2
25. See S. REP. No. 573, 74th Cong., 1st Sess. 9-11 (1935), reprinted in,
that
observed
Committee
The
2309-10.
LEGIS. HIST.-NLRA, supra note 22, at
in"t]he so-called 'company union' features of the bill are designed to prevent
might
or
serve
that
workers
their
of
terference by employers with organizations
serve as collective bargaining agencies." Id. at 10.
26. 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(2) (1988).
27. Id. § 152(5) (1988).
28. Id. (emphasis added).
in
29. Pennsylvania Greyhound Lines, Inc., 1 N.L.R.B. 1 (1935), enforced
an
that
(holding
(1938)
261
U.S.
303
rev'd,
1937),
Cir.
(3d
178
F.2d
part, 91
"employee representation plan" was a labor organization under section 2(5)
since it was created, planned, sponsored, and required by management). See
infra note 62.
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with the formation or administration of a labor organization.3 ° In order to find that a "labor organization" exists,
three elements must be met: (1) employees must participate;
(2) the organization must exist for the purpose of "dealing
with" the employer; and (3) the dealing must concern condi31

tions of employment.
In NLRB v. Cabot Carbon Co.,32 the Court defined "deal-

33
ing" as a more encompassing term than mere "bargaining."
Accordingly, even if a labor-management cooperation committee does not literally bargain with the employer, it may
still be held to be a labor organization under section 2(5) if its
actions fall under the broader definition of dealing with the
employer.3 4 Unfortunately, the Court did not elaborate on
this definition and subsequent case law developed a number
of different tests to identify a "labor organization," including
the subject matter of discussion, the function and form of the
group, employer intent and employee participation, and the
authority of the group.3 5 In NLRB v. Newport News Shipbuilding & Drydock Co.,36 the Court indicated that a certain
degree of structural dependence of a joint committee on an
employer would constitute unlawful37domination by the employer in violation of section 8(a)(2).
This broad definition of an employer-dominated labor organization thus limits recent labor-management cooperation
efforts whenever these efforts have any structural link to the
employer or include any sort of dealing with the employer.
Given the goal of cooperation, such interactive contacts are

30. Beth Israel Hosp. v. NLRB, 437 U.S. 483, 500-01 (1978) (affirming that
the NLRB is the body established by Congress to interpret the NLRA, subject to
limited judicial review).
31. 29 U.S.C. § 152(5) (1988). See infra note 62 for the language of this
section.
32. 360 U.S. 203 (1959). See infra part II.C.3.
33. Cabot Carbon, 360 U.S. at 211.

34. Id. at 211-13.
35. See generally Michael S.Beaver, Are Worker ParticipationPlans "Labor
Organizations"Within the Meaning of Section 2(5)?: A ProposedFramework of

Analysis, 36 LAB.L.J. 226 (1985).
36. 308 U.S. 241 (1939); see supra part II.C.1.
37. Newport News, 308 U.S. at 251. The Court established this standard
despite evidence that the employees actively supported the joint committee and
that the joint committee had been founded with a noncoercive purpose. Id. at
244.
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nearly impossible to avoid. In Electromation, Inc.,3 the
NLRB determined that the presence of several action committees established by the employer to involve employees in
problem-solving constituted a violation of section 8(a)(2) because they were employer-dominated and because they ex3 9
isted to "deal with" the employer. NLRB Chairman James
Stephens wrote the plurality opinion which was accompanied
by three concurrences by the remaining members of the
NLRB. Each concurrence presented a different perspective
on the majority's enforcement of the traditional two-part test
(domination/labor organization), and each emphasized the
importance of labor-management cooperation efforts in the
and of allowing for greater latitude for their
workplace
40
support.
Despite this apparent diversity of perspective throughout
the NLRB, the Electromation case was not an aberration. In
E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Co.,41 the NLRB again held that
several action committees created by the employer were labor
organizations because they were "dealing" with the employer
in a way that did not fall into any of the narrow exceptions
since they functioned to make group proposals to the42emIn
ployer rather than as individual communication devices.
E.I. du Pont, the NLRB made no effort to limit the definition
of the "dealing" which constitutes a labor organization,
although it did provide a clearer explanation of the activities
that constitute "dealing." Once again, NLRB Member Dennis
M. Devaney concurred but wrote separately to emphasize
that "the Board should focus enforcement of the provision on
the specific evils" targeted by Congress, while otherwise leaving employers free to interact with their employees to effect
43
The primary evil adlabor-management cooperation.
dressed by the NLRA is industrial strife, but the specific goal
of section 8(a)(2) is ensuring impartial representation.
38. Electromation, Inc., 309 N.L.R.B. 990 (1992), enforced, Electromation,
Inc. v. NLRB, 1994 U.S. App. LEXIS 25612 (7th Cir. Sept. 15, 1994); see supra
part II.D.1.
39. Electromation, 309 N.L.R.B. at 997.
40. Id. at 998-1015 (Devaney, M., Oviatt, M., and Raudabaugh, M.,

concurring).

41. 311 N.L.R.B. 893 (1993); see supra part II.D.2.
42. E.I. du Pont, 311 N.L.R.B. at 895.
43. Id. at 899 (Devaney, M., concurring).

232

B.

SANTA CLARA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 35

Legislative History of the NLRA

The NLRA was enacted in 1935 to eliminate industrial
warfare occasioned by the unfair balance of power between
employers and employees by establishing a framework within
which conflicts could be resolved. 4 4 To accomplish this purpose, the NLRA established the rights of employees to organize and bargain collectively with employers. 45 The company

union was recognized as one of several threats to the balance
46
of power and concomitant employee rights.
Ironically, the concept of company unions was first introduced in the early part of the twentieth century by reformers
seeking, for philosophical or religious reasons, to democratize
the workplace and make it more productive. 4 7 With the increasing strength and numbers of organized labor, some busi44. See S. REP. No. 573, 74th Cong., 1st Sess. 1 (1935) ("The first objective
of the bill is to promote industrial peace."), reprinted in 2 LEGis. HiST.-NLRA,
supra note 22, at 2300; see also S. 2926, 73d Cong., 2d Sess., title 1, § 2 (1934),
reprinted in 1 LEGIS. HIsT.-NLRA, supra note 22, at 1 (stating purpose of bill is
to encourage "the equalization of bargaining power of employers and employees, [and provide] agencies for the peaceful settlement of disputes").
45. National Labor Relations (Wagner) Act, ch. 372, § 7, 49 Stat. 452 (1935)
(amended by ch. 120, title I, § 101, 61 Stat. 140 (1947)) (current version at 29
U.S.C. § 157 (1988)). Section 7 provided that "[e]mployees shall have the right
to self-organization, to form, join, or assist labor organizations, to bargain collectively through representatives of their own choosing, and to engage in other
concerted activities for the purpose of collective bargaining or mutual aid or
protection." Id.
46. Senator Wagner viewed the company union as the most significant
threat to the goals of the NLRA. 78 CONG. REC. 3443 (1934) (introductory statement of Sen. Wagner), reprinted in 1 LEGIS. HIST.-NLRA, supra note 22, at 1518 (1949).
47. See generally SAMUEL HABER, EFFICIENCY AND UPLIFT 124-25 (1964). As
the title of this book suggests, there has been an ongoing American obsession
with the twin goals of commercial efficiency and industrial democratization.
The prime example of the former goal is Frederick W. Taylor's theory of"scientific" industrial management which envisioned the workplace (viz., the factory)
as one great machine wherein maximum efficiency was achieved by scientific
systemization of tasks, streamlining of tools and procedures, and the provision
of incentives by management, id. at 21-26, resulting in a "radical separation of
thinking from doing," id. at 24. Variations on the theory of scientific management, notably by Henry Ford, developed throughout the 1910's and 1920's. Id.
at 160-67. However, the best recognized aspect of Taylorism today is its impact
on industrial democratization. Id. at 167. Various theories of industrial democratization developed alongside Taylorism but posited that improving the condition of the individual employee would have the effect of greater commercial efficiency while Taylorism relied on the work ethic to improve the human
condition. Id. at 20. Theories of industrial democracy were based on religious
and social motives, as well as more practical motives such as fending off trade
unions. Id. at 124-25.
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nesses instituted company unions, ostensibly to appease their
workforces while still maintaining control over the means of
labor organization. 48 During World War II, the War Labor
Board encouraged the formation of employee committees to
increase efficiency and productivity. These were established
and operated under management control, and some continued to function after the War Labor Board authorization
ceased.49
The National Industrial Recovery Act of 1933 contained
50 Employers refashthe prototype for section 7 of the NLRA.
ioned their company unions to comply with the new law by
eliminating the appearance of management presence on the
committees, even though management still created these employee representation committees and thus continued to exer5 1 Further, there was a marked incise considerable power.
crease in the number of company unions, as many nonorganized employers sought to avoid being forced to deal with
2 In 1933, 45% of employees were
an external organization.
"represented" by company unions while only 9.3% of employ53
trade unions.
ees were dealing with employers through
1.

NLRA Section 8(a)(2)

Section 8(a)(2) 54 was enacted specifically to counteract
the evils associated with company unions and employee rep(1926);
48. See generally ERNEST R. BURTON, EMPLOYEE REPRESENTATION
(1923).
CARROLL E. FRENCH, THE SHOP COMMITTEE IN THE UNITED STATES

49. See RUSSELL A. SMITH ET AL., LABOR RELATIONS LAW 115 (7th ed. 1984).
Act
50. 29 U.S.C. § 157 (1988) includes § 7(a) National Industrial Recovery

provisions that "[e]mployees shall have the right to self-organization [and to]
organize and bargain collectively through representatives of their own choos-

ing," free from employer interference, coercion or restraint. 49 Stat. 452 (1935).
Cf. supra note 45.
51. See 78 CONG. REC. 4229 (1934) (Mar. 11, 1934 New York Times article
by Sen. Wagner included in the record), reprinted in 1 LEGIS. HIST.-NLRA,

supra note 22, at 23; see also Cox, supra note 23, at 200-01.

52. See National Labor Relations Board: Hearings on S. 1958 Before the

Senate Committee on Education and Labor, 74th Cong., 1st Sess. 40 (1935)

22,
(statement of Sen. Wagner), reprinted in 1 LEGIS. HIST.-NLRA, supra note
at 1416.

53. See 78 CONG. REC. 4229 (1934) (Mar. 11, 1934 New York Times article

by Senator Wagner included in the record), reprinted in 1 LEGIS. HIST.-NLRA,

supra note 22, at 23.
54. The section provides that,
It shall be an unlawful labor practice for an employer (2) to dominate
or interfere with the formation or administration of any labor organization or contribute financial or other support to it: Provided, That
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Such employer constructs

threatened the balance of power established through the collective bargaining framework by implementing spurious rep56
resentation which was not in the employees' best interests.
The original draft of this provision made it an unfair labor
practice for an employer to "initiate, participate in, supervise,
or influence the formation, constitution, bylaws, other governing rules, operations, policies or elections of any labor organization."5 7 The provision was later modified to allow employees to "confer with [the employer] during working hours
without loss of time or pay" based upon testimony at the Congressional hearings that certain unaffiliated employee organizations confined to representing employees on a single employer basis often operated in an amicable and cooperative
atmosphere."
The phrase "to dominate or interfere with the formation
or administration" was substituted for the more inclusive
original language upon recognition that an employer might
initiate a labor organization amongst its employees without
posing a threat to its employees' freedom of choice of a bargaining representative. 59 Although the formative stage of organization was viewed as most susceptible to interference by
subject to rules and regulations made and published by the Board pursuant to section 156 of this title, an employer shall not be prohibited
from permitting employees to confer with him during working hours
without loss of time or pay.
29 U.S.C. 158(a)(2) (1988).
55. See S. REP. No. 573, 74th Cong., 1st Sess. 9-10 (1935), reprinted in 2
LEGIS. HIST.-NLRA, supra note 22, at 2309-10.
56. See 78 CONG. REC. 3443 (1934) (introductory statement of Sen. Wagner),
reprinted in 1 LEGIS. HIST.-NLRA, supra note 22, at 15; see also Labor Disputes
Act: Hearings on H.R. 6288 Before the House Comm. on Labor, 74th Cong., 1st
Sess. 15 (1935)(statement of Sen. Wagner), reprinted in 2 LEGIS. HIST.-NLRA,
supra note 22, at 2489. "Collective bargaining becomes a sham when the employer sits on both sides of the table or pulls the strings behind the spokesman
of those with whom he is dealing." Id.
57. S. 2926, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. § 5(3) (1934), reprinted in 1 LEGIS. HIST.NLRA, supra note 22, at 3.
58. S. REP. No. 573, 74th Cong., 1st Sess. 10 (1935), reprinted in 2 LEGIS.
HIST.-NLRA, supra note 22, at 2309.
59. See Labor Disputes Act: Hearings on H.R. 6288 Before the House Committee on Labor, 74th Cong., 1st Sess. 15 (1935) (statement of Sen. Wagner,
explaining that the focus should be on whether or not the organization itself is
"independent of the employee-employer relationship"), reprinted at 2 LEGIS.
HIST.-NLRA, supra note 22, at 2489.
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the employer, 60 an employer's mere suggestion that its employees organize (thus "initiating" a labor organization) did
61
not rise to the level of "domination" and "interference."
Thus, section 8(a)(2) was narrowed somewhat from its original sweeping scope to acknowledge realistic communications
between labor and management, without eliminating restrictions against sham bargaining and similar representative
efforts.
2.

NLRA Section 2(5)

An understanding of the term "labor organization" in section 8(a)(2) is essential to the analysis of employer domination. However, section 2(5)62 is not entirely enlightening on
its face and reference to the legislative history of the provision is necessary. The term "labor organization" was broadly
defined to generically incorporate any group which could conceivably serve as a bargaining representative for employees. 63 The NLRB was given wide latitude to interpret the
NLRA provisions, subject to judicial review, and thus to further refine the definition. 64 Senator Wagner himself emphasized that "nothing in the measure discourages employees
from uniting on an independent- or company-union basis, if
by these terms we mean simply an organization confined to
the limits of one plant or one employer. Nothing in the bill
60. "Such interferences exist when employers actively participate in fram-

ing the constitution or bylaws or labor organizations." S. REP. No. 573, 74th

Cong., 1st Sess. 10 (1935), reprinted in 2 LEGIS. HisT.-NLRA, supra note 22, at
2309.
61. See STAFF OF SENATE COMM. ON EDUCATION AND LABOR, 74TH CONG., 1ST
SESS. (1935), COMPARISON OF S. 2926 (73D CONGRESS) AND S. 1958 (74TH CONGRESS) 27 (Comm. Print 1935), reprinted in 1 LEGIS. HIST.-NLRA, supra note 22,
at 1352.
62. This section provides that,
The term "labor organization" means any organization of any kind, or
any agency or employee representation committee or plan, in which
employees participate and which exists for the purpose, in whole or in
part, of dealing with employers concerning grievances, labor disputes,
wages, rates of pay, hours of employment or conditions of work.
29 U.S.C. § 152(5) (1988).
63. See S. REP. No. 573, 74th Cong., 1st Sess. 7 (1935), reprinted in 2 LEGIS.
HIST.-NLRA, supra note 22, at 2306.
64. Beth Israel Hosp. v. NLRB, 437 U.S. 483, 500-01 (1978) (affirming that
the NLRB is the body established by Congress to interpret the NLRA).
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prevents employers from maintaining free and direct relations with their workers ....
The term "labor organization" was originally defined as,
"any organization, labor union, association, corporation, or
society of any kind in which employees participate to any degree whatsoever, which exists for the purpose, in whole or in
part, of dealing with employers concerning grievances, labor
disputes, wages, rates of pay, or hours of employment."6 6
However, the final Act was re-worded to include a specific reference to a common form of employer-dominated unions: the
employee representation committee.6 7 The "employee representation committee" was a familiar form of company-dominated union in 1935, and was the specific type of organization
which section 8(a)(2) was enacted to enjoin.68
Thus, this definition requires three elements: (1) an organization, agency, or employee representation committee or
plan; (2) employee participation; and (3) the purpose of dealing with employees concerning mandatory bargaining subjects. An organization existing for other purposes would not
qualify as a labor organization under the NLRA. Thus, it was
observed that certain types of employer-employee communication, not otherwise outlawed, were lawful, since the goal of
the NLRA was to "remove from the industrial scene unfair
pressure, not fair discussion."6 9 Further, it was recognized
that employees were under no obligation to exercise their section 7 rights to self-organization and collective bargaining, in
which case any labor-management cooperation effort might
65. 79

CONG. REC.

2368 (1935), reprinted in 1

LEGIS.

HiST.-NLRA, supra

note 22, at 1312-13.

66. S.2926, 73d Cong., 2d Sess., title 1, § 3(5) (1935), reprinted in 1 LEGIS.
HIST.-NLRA, supra note 22, at 2.
67. See To Create a NationalLabor Board:Hearings on S.2926 Before the
Senate Committee on Education and Labor, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. 241 (1934)
(statement of Edwin E. Witte, Labor Expert), reprintedin 1 LEGIs. HiST.-NLRA,
supra note 22, at 271.
68. See STAFF OF SENATE COMMITTEE ON EDUCATION AND LABOR, 74TH
CONG., 1ST SEss. (1935), COMPARISON OF S. 2926 (73d CONGRESS) AND S. 1958
(74TH CONGRESS) 27 (Comm. Print 1935), reprinted in 1 LEGIS. HIST.-NLRA,
supra note 22, at 1352.
69. S. REP. No. 1184, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. (1934), reprinted in 1 LEGIS. HIST.NLRA, supra note 22, at 1104. "[Tlhese abuses do not seem.., so general that
the Government should forbid employers to indulge in the normal relations and
innocent communications which are part of all friendly relations between employer and employee." Id.
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be lawful, regardless of the amount of employer domination
involved.7"
The Taft-Hartley Amendments to the NLRA
In 1947, the NLRA was amended by the Taft-Hartley
7 1 The overriding concern of the Taft-Hartley amendAct.
72
ments was the rapidly expanding power of the unions.
Among the proposed provisions was one that would have allowed the formation of employee committees by an employer
for discussion of the usual bargaining subjects even if the em7 3 Instead, the fiployees had no bargaining representative.
74 The initial proponal version amended NLRA section 9(a).
sal was rejected as redundant since the NLRA did not
3.

70. Section 7 includes the right to refrain from exercising employee rights
under the NLRA. 29 U.S.C. § 157 (1935). See also To Create a National Labor
Relations Board:Hearings on S. 2926 Before the Senate Committee on Education and Labor, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. 9 (1934) (statement of Sen. Wagner), reprinted in, 1 LEGIS. HIsT.-NLRA, supra note 22, at 39:
Let me make it absolutely clear that the bill does not in any way impair the rights of employees to organize on the single employer or company union basis, if that is their desire. It simply forbids employers to
force development along such lines alone, and prevents them from
dominating their workers when the workers desire a company union.
Id.
71. Labor Management Relations (Taft-Hartley) Act, ch. 120, title I, § 101,
61 Stat. 136 (1947), as amended.
72. See Labor Management Relations (Taft-Hartley) Act, Ch. 120, title 1,
§ 101, 61 Stat. 136 (1947), reprinted in 1 NLRB, LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE
LABOR MANAGEMENT RELATIONS ACT, 1947, at 2 (1947) [hereinafter LEGis.
HIST.-LMRA]. See also Cox, supra note 23, at 93-94. The introductory report
for this legislation cataloged a number of abuses to which employees and employers had been subject since the passage of the NLRA in 1935 at the hands of
unions and urged the passage of legislation to reestablish an equitable balance
of power in the workplace. H.R. REP. No. 245, 80th Cong., 1st Sess. 3-4 (1947),
reprinted in 1 LEGIS. HIST.-LMRA, at 295-96 (1947).
73. The relevant provision reads as follows:
(d) Notwithstanding any other provision of this section, the following
shall not constitute or be evidence of an unfair labor practice under any
of the provisions of this Act:
(3) Forming or maintaining by an employer of a committee of employees and discussing with it matters of mutual interest, including grievances, wages, hours of employment, and other working
conditions, if the Board has not certified or the employer has not
recognized a representative as their representative under section
9.
H.R. 3020, 80th Cong., 1st Sess. § 8(d)(3) (1947), reprinted in 1 LEGIS. HIsT.LMRA, supra note 72, at 56.
74. Section 9(a) allows employers to adjust grievances presented to them by
employees, "as long as the adjustment is not inconsistent with the terms of a
collective-bargaining contract or agreement then in effect: Provided further,
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explicitly prevent employees from meeting with their employer, and the revision to section 9(a) conceded to employers
the capacity to answer employee grievances.7 5 Thus, even in
1947, twelve years after the passage of the NLRA, there was
still a pronounced concern about company unions and
preventing their resurgence. 76 Although the Taft-Hartley
amendment did not affect the definition of a labor organization,7 7 and attempts to specifically amend section 8(a)(2) were
rejected, 78 the scope of lawful employer-employee communications was slightly expanded by allowing employers to respond to their employees' grievances.
4.

Summary

Although Congress enacted section 8(a)(2) to address the
prevalent threat to industrial peace imminent in the continued existence of company unions, specifically employee representation committees, section 8(a)(2) still appeared to allow
some limited room for employee-employer communications.
This is suggested by both the modifications to the original
Wagner Act and by the Taft-Hartley amendments.
C.

Judicialand Agency Interpretation
1.

NLRA Section 8(a)(2)-Newport News and
Employer Domination

The Supreme Court ruled early and only once, in NLRB
v. Newport News, Shipbuilding & Drydock Co.,19 on whether
employee committees violate section 8(a)(2) prohibitions
against domination and interference. In Newport News, the
employer had established an employee committee in 1927 in
cooperation with its employees in order to "give employees a
voice in respect of the conditions of their labor and to provide
a procedure for the prevention and adjustment of future difThat the bargaining representative has been given opportunity to be present at
such adjustment. . . ." 29 U.S.C. § 159(a) (1988).
75. See H.R. CONF. REP. No. 510, 80th Cong., 1st Sess. 45 (1947), reprinted
in 1 LEGIS. HIST.-LMRA, supra note 72, at 549.
76. H.R. MIN. REP. No. 245, 80th Cong., 1st Sess. 86 (1947), reprinted in 1
LEGIS. HIST.-LMRA, supra note 72, at 376.
77. See id. at 33, reprinted in 1 LEGIs. HIST.-LMRA, supra note 72, at 537.
78. See 93 CONG. REC. S6600 (daily ed. June 5, 1947), reprinted in 2 LEGIS.
HIST.-LMRA, supra note 72, at 1539.
79. 308 U.S. 241 (1939).
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ferences." ° Several joint committees, composed of five representatives elected by the employees and five representatives
selected by management (none of whom were supervisors),
administered the plan."' Management's representatives
were "to keep the management in touch with the representain negotiations with
tives and represent the management
82
their officers and committees."
The plan was amended several times to consolidate the
committees, but retained an equal number of representatives
83 In 1937, after
from both management and the employees.
the validity of the NLRA had been sustained by the Supreme
Court, the plan was revised, on approval of employees and
management.8 4 The revised plan eliminated payment of compensation to the elected representatives, and established an
"Employees' Representation Committee" composed solely of
the actions of
employees in place of the bipartisan committee,
8 5 A poll of the
company.
which were final on approval by the
employees revealed an overwhelming majority approval of
the plan as revised.8 6
The Court concurred with the findings of the NLRB that,
despite the 1937 revisions, the organization had historically
been dominated and controlled by the employer and that the
purpose of section 8(a)(2) could only be achieved by the dises8 7 Having made this finding,
tablishment of the committee.
the Court did not reach the issue of whether the committee,
8 8 The
as revised, was in compliance with section 8(a)(2).
NLRB decision designated various contentions made by the
employer regarding the revised committee as irrelevant. Instead, the NLRB concentrated on the fact that management
approval was still necessary for committee action to be effective or to amend the plan, which led the NLRB to the conclusion that the employer still unlawfully dominated the com80. Id. at 244.
81. Id. at 244-45.
82. Id. at 245.
83. Id.
84. NLRB v. Newport News, Shipbuilding & Drydock Co., 308 U.S. 241, 246
(1939).
85. Id. at 246-47.
86. Id. at 248.
87. Id. at 251.
88. Id. at 250. The Court passed on the issue of whether the committee was
a labor organization, not whether the committee had been dominated. Id. at
251 (1939).
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mittee.8 9 The Court approved the NLRB's disestablishment
order and failed to reach the issue of whether the revised
committee was legal.90 The Court concluded that "it was for
Congress to determine whether, as a matter of policy, such a
plan should be permitted to continue in force." 91
2. Alternative Interpretationsof Section 8(a)(2)
Domination
Not all the circuit courts have followed Newport News.
One line of interpretation has relaxed the standard for finding domination to allow for the possibility of labor-management cooperation. 92 This interpretation requires that actual
(as opposed to inferred) domination be found to demonstrate
an unfair labor practice under section 8(a)(2), 93 and proposes
a subjective test from the employees' standpoint to determine
the existence of domination.94 One court stated, "[a] line
must be drawn ...

between support and cooperation. Sup-

port, even though innocent, can be identified because it constitutes at least some degree of control or influence. Cooperation only assists the employees or their bargaining
representative in carrying out their independent intention. "9 5
This interpretation has been followed and expanded
upon in other circuit courts. 96 The subjective test continues
89. NLRB v. Newport News, Shipbuilding & Drydock Co., 308 U.S. 241,249
(1939).
90. Id. at 250.
While men are free to adopt any form of organization and representation whether purely local or connected with a national body, their purpose so to do may be obstructed by the existence and recognition by the
management of an old plan or organization the original structure or
operation of which was not in accordance with the provisions of the
law.
Id.
91. Id. at 251.
92. Chicago Rawhide Mfg. Co. v. NLRB, 221 F.2d 165, 168 (7th Cir. 1955).
The court noted that "[nleither mere cooperation, preference nor possibility of
control constitute unfair labor practices; and the Board may not infer conduct
that is violative of the Act from conduct that is not, unless there is a substantial
basis, in fact or reason, for that inference." Id. at 168.
93. Id. at 168.
94. Id. The Chicago Rawhide court also laid a heavy emphasis on the motives of the employer. Id. at 167.
95. Id.
96. See NLRB v. Homemaker Shops, Inc., 724 F.2d 535 (6th Cir. 1984);
NLRB v. Northeastern Univ., 601 F.2d 1208 (1st Cir. 1979); Hertzka & Knowles
v. NLRB, 503 F.2d 625 (9th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 875 (1975); Mod-
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to require that the employer has actually interfered with and
dominated the employees' freedom of choice and the test for
this interference remains subjective, from the employees'
point of view.97 Later cases have gone further, however, requiring a more objective demonstration of actual domination
such as a showing of anti-union bias and active domination by
98
the employer in addition to the subjective test. Even the
NLRB allowed for the possibility of modern labor-management cooperation by providing a slightly more relaxed test
under certain circumstances. 99
3. NLRA Section 2(5)-Cabot Carbon and the
Definition of a Labor Organization
The Supreme Court's definition of a "labor organization,"
for the purpose of determining whether an employee committee is an unlawful "labor organization" violative00 of section
In Cabot
8(a)(2), is set out in NLRB v. Cabot Carbon Co.'
at
committee
employee
an
established
Carbon, the employer
ProducWar
the
of
each of its plants pursuant to a suggestion
tion Board in 1943.101 The stated purpose of the committees

problems of
was to provide a forum for employees' views and102
management.
and
mutual interest to employees
Working with employee representatives, the employer
prepared bylaws, stating the duties and functions of the committees, subject to the approval of the employees establishing
those committees. 10 3 The bylaws also determined the
ern Plastics Corp. v. NLRB, 379 F.2d 201 (6th Cir. 1967); Coppus Eng'g Corp. v.
NLRB, 240 F.2d 564 (1st Cir. 1957).
97. Hertzka & Knowles v. NLRB, 503 F.2d 625, 630 (9th Cir. 1974), cert.
denied, 423 U.S. 875 (1975).
98. Modern Plastics Corp. v. NLRB, 379 F.2d 201, 204 (6th Cir. 1967). The
court held that "[the Board must prove that the employer's assistance is actually creating Company control over the union before it has established a violation of Section 8(a)(2)." Id. The Modern Plasticscourt also maintained that the
purpose of the NLRA was to encourage cooperation and that industrial peace
was merely a "prime purpose" of the NLRA, fostered through collective bargaining. Id.
99. The NLRB found no domination, only unlawful assistance, under a
slightly relaxed totality of circumstances test, where the employees determined
the structure and formation of the committee. Duquesne Univ., 198 N.L.R.B.
891, 893 (1972).
100. 360 U.S. 203 (1959).
101. Id. at 205.
102. Id.
103. Id.
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number of employees on each committee and their terms, the
election procedure, the meeting times, and the grievance procedure, and established that employees would be paid for
time served on the committees.10 4 The committees had no
dues and the employer paid all the expenses. 10 5 With the advent of NLRB certified labor organizations at many of the
reduced to
plants, the committees' functions were effectively
10 6
issues.
grievance
and
efficiency, production
The Supreme Court rejected the court of appeals' holding
that the committees were not labor organizations because
they did not bargain with the employers, but instead held
that section 2(5) expanded the definition of "labor organization" by use of the word "dealing" to include more than mere
bargaining. 10 7 The Court concluded that the committees'
grievance procedure came within the ambit of "dealing" and
that the proposals made by the committees to management
related to conditions of work as well as several of the specific
bargainable issues listed in section 2(5). 108 The Court observed that a (lawful) independent labor organization would
have the power to insist on its proposals, whereas an (unlawful) company-dominated labor organization would not. 10 9
Therefore, if an employee committee exists "in part at least"
to deal with the employer on grievances and bargaining subjects, it is an unlawful labor organization if the employer exercises direct control over it. 110
The NLRB has consistently followed this definition of "labor organizations" in finding various committees violative of
section 8(a)(2). 1 1 Each case demonstrates some combination
of factors indicating a lack of structural independence from
the employer. These factors include a lack of significant employee input into the function and formation of the committees, and employer control of the composition of the commit104. Id. at 205-06.
105. NLRB v. Cabot Carbon Co., 360 U.S. "03, 209 (1959).
106. Id.
107. Id. at 211-13.
108. Id. at 213-14.
109. Id. at 214.
110. NLRB v. Cabot Carbon Co., 360 U.S. 203, 212-13 (1959).
111. See Ona Corp., 285 N.L.R.B. 400, 405 (1987); Liberty Mkts., Inc., 236
N.L.R.B. 1486, 1492 (1978); Clapper's Mfg., Inc., 186 N.L.R.B. 324, 334 (1970),
enforced, 458 F.2d 414 (3d Cir. 1972); Grafton Boat Co., 173 N.L.R.B. 999, 100203 (1968); Ambox, Inc., 146 N.L.R.B. 1520, 1530-31 (1964), enforced in part, 357
F.2d 138 (5th Cir. 1966).
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tees and the topics of discussion, as well as holding
committee meetings on company time, on company premises,
at the employer's convenience, with at least one member of
management present. 112 Furthermore, these committees discussed and presented proposals to management regarding
terms and conditions of employment. 113 Although each com1 4 and
mittee was formed for an ostensibly neutral purpose,
15
in each case
given names evoking a cooperative venture,
recognia
union's
with
the committee's formation coincided
tion campaign.1 The NLRB's broad interpretation of1 "deal17
ing" has generally been accepted in the circuit courts.
4. Alternative Interpretationsof Section 2(5) Labor
Organizations
Two Sixth Circuit Court cases departed abruptly from
the NLRB/Cabot Carbon standards. In NLRB v. Streamway
Division of Scott & Fetzer Co., 1 18 the court held that a mixed

employee-management committee designed to improve communications between management and employees, although
dominated by the employer, was not a section 2(5) labor or112. See Ona Corp., 285 N.L.R.B. at 402; Liberty Mkts., Inc., 236 N.L.R.B. at
1492; Clapper'sMfg., Inc., 186 N.L.R.B. at 333; Grafton Boat Co., 173 N.L.R.B.
at 1002; Ambox, Inc., 146 N.L.R.B. at 1530-31.
113. See Ona Corp., 285 N.L.R.B. at 403; Liberty Mkts., Inc., 236 N.L.R.B. at
1496; Clapper'sMfg., Inc., 186 N.L.R.B. at 333; Grafton Boat Co., 173 N.L.R.B.
at 1002; Ambox, Inc., 146 N.L.R.B. at 1530.
114. See Ona Corp., 285 N.L.R.B. at 402 (improving quality of work life);
Clapper's Mfg., Inc., 186 N.L.R.B. at 334 (serving as an oral suggestion box);
Grafton Boat Co., 173 N.L.R.B. at 1001-02 (advising management on working
conditions and unjust practices).
115. See Ona Corp., 285 N.L.R.B. at 402 (employee action committee); Liberty Mkts., Inc., 236 N.L.R.B. at 1492 (management advisory committee); Clapper's Mfg., Inc., 186 N.L.R.B. at 332 (Employees' Committee); Grafton Boat Co.,
173 N.L.R.B. at 1000 (Labor-Management Committee); Ambox, Inc., 146
N.L.R.B. at 1530 (Employee-Management Relations Council).
116. See Ona Corp., 285 N.L.R.B. 400, 402 (1987); Liberty Mkts., Inc., 236
N.L.R.B. 1486, 1492-93 (1978); Clapper's Mfg., Inc., 186 N.L.R.B. 324, 326
(1970), enforced, 458 F.2d 414 (3d Cir. 1972); Grafton Boat Co., 173 N.L.R.B.
999, 1003 (1968); Ambox, Inc., 146 N.L.R.B. 1520, 1528-29 (1964), enforced in
part, 357 F.2d 138 (5th Cir. 1966).
117. See NLRB v. Fremont Mfg. Co., 558 F.2d 889 (8th Cir. 1977); NLRB v.
Clapper's Mfg., Inc., 458 F.2d 414 (3d Cir. 1972); NLRB v. Walton Mfg. Co., 289
F.2d 177 (5th Cir. 1961); NLRB v. Standard Coil Prods. Co., 224 F.2d 465 (1st
Cir. 1955), cert. denied, 350 U.S. 902 (1955); NLRB v. Stow Mfg. Co., 217 F.2d
900 (2d Cir. 1954), cert. denied, 348 U.S. 964 (1955).
118. 691 F.2d 288 (6th Cir. 1982).
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ganization and thus did not violate section 8(a)(2). 119 The
goal of the committee was to serve as a communication device
between management and labor regarding the company's
plans and programs, and to identify operational problem areas, and possible solutions. 120 While observing that the term
"dealing" was broadly defined by Congress and by the Cabot
Carbon Court for the purpose of preventing not only company
unions but also other sham mechanisms purporting to represent employees, the court determined that the amount of interaction which constituted "dealing" was still an open
question. 121
The court also followed the view that the adversarial
model of employer-employee relations is an "anachronism,"
and that management ought to be able to communicate with
employees.' 22 Thus, the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals has
demonstrated its willingness to "reject a rigid interpretation
of the statute and consider whether the employer's behavior
fosters employee free expression and choice as the Act requires. 1 2 3 One consideration in finding that the committee is
not a labor organization is the continuous rotation of em1 24
ployee members to allow for maximum participation.
Thus, the committee is less a representational body for the
employee population than a forum for individual communication with management. Other considerations included the
lack of anti-union animus or other evidence of employer's intent to stall an organizational drive or assume the union's du119. Id. at 294-95.
120. Id. at 289. The company clearly dominated the Committee by establishing it, and setting its agenda and structure, id., and the court acknowledged
that "there is little question that if it is a 'labor organization' under section 2(5)
of the Act, the Committee was dominated by the Company." Id. at 291.
121. Id. at 291-92. The court also tried to distinguish Cabot Carbon on its
facts because it involved "a more active, ongoing association between management and employees, which the term dealing connotes, than is present here."
Id. at 294.
122. Id. at 293.
123. NLRB v. Streamway Div. of Scott & Fetzer Co., 691 F.2d 288, 293 (6th
Cir. 1982). "An overly broad construction of the statute would be as destructive
of the objects as [sic] the Act as ignoring the provision entirely." Id. at 292. "It
erects an iron curtain between employer and employees, penetrable only by the
bargaining agent of a certified union, if there is one, preventing the development of a decent, honest, constructive relationship between management and
labor." Id. (quoting NLRB v. Walton Mfg. Co., 289 F.2d 177, 182 (5th Cir. 1961)
(Wisdom, J., dissenting)).
124. Id. at 294-95.
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recognition that the committee
ties, and the lack of general
125
organization.
was a labor
In Airstream, Inc. v. NLRB, 126 the employer formed the
"President's Advisory Council," composed of elected representatives, as a forum for discussion of various problematic
employment issues, at approximately the same time as an organizational drive was underway. 127 Once again, the em1 28
ployer clearly dominated the labor-management council.
However, following the Streamway "communication device"
theory, the court held that the Council was not a "labor organization," especially since the employer took no action regarding employee complaints during the course of the union
1 29
campaign, and thus did not adversely affect the campaign.
In summary, "not all management efforts to communicate
with employees concerning company personnel policy are forbidden on pain of violating the Act." 13 0
5. NLRB-Sanctioned Exceptions to the Section 2(5)
Labor Organization
The NLRB has also recognized two rare exceptions to the
section 2(5) labor organization rule, where employee committees exist without dealing with the employer. In General
Foods Corp.,13 1 the (then non-unionized) employer established job enrichment "teams" composed of the entire bargaining unit to discuss operational issues. 132 The NLRB accepted that the "teams" were not established to head off
organizational drives but rather in response to behavioral
psychology studies so as to provide employees with greater
involvement in the workplace. 1 33 Although the teams discussed conditions of employment, the NLRB held they were
not "labor organizations" for two reasons: first, the employer's
125. Id. at 295.
126. 877 F.2d 1291 (6th Cir. 1989).
127. Id. at 1294.
128. Id. Although employees elected their own representatives, Airstream
formed the Council, set its agenda, and meetings took place on company time
for which employees were paid. All this coincided with the organizational drive
and addressed many of the same issues raised by the union. Id.
129. Id. at 1297-98.
130. NLRB v. Streamway Div. of Scott & Fetzer Co., 691 F.2d 288, 292 (6th
Cir. 1982).
131. 231 N.L.R.B. 1232 (1977).
132. Id. at 1233.
133. Id. at 1232, 1234.
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motive for establishing the committees "had nothing to do
with labor relations;" 13 4 and second, there was no proper
agency relationship of the organization to the employees on
whose behalf it was called upon to act since the entire bar135
gaining unit comprised the membership of the teams.
Thus, where all of a company's employees are part of a labormanagement cooperation effort, the group is not "dealing"
with the employers.
The second exception developed by the NLRB to the
broad definition of "dealing" concerns the delegation of managerial responsibilities. In Spark's Nugget, Inc., 36 the Employees' Council performed a purely adjudicatory function,
resolving employees' grievances, and did not interact with
management for any purpose other than to render a final decision on the grievance. 137 In Mercy-Memorial Hospital
the Employees' Grievance Committee was created
Corp.,
solely to give employees a voice in resolving the grievances of
their fellow employees and thus did not "deal" with the employer.1 39 Thus, where a committee maintains some independent jurisdiction, separate from management, it is not
held to be "dealing" with management.
6.

Summary

The current standards for lawful labor-management
committees are ambiguous at best. The Sixth Circuit Court
challenged the objective Newport News domination standard
on the theory that a distinction can feasibly be made between
actual domination and lawful labor-management cooperation
by use of a subjective test of employer motive and employee
134. The NLRB noted that "[iun their essence, the teams, and each of them,
are nothing more or less than work crews established by Respondent as administrative subdivisions of its entire employee complement." Id. at 1234.
135. Id. The NLRB remarked, "an entire bargaining unit, viewed as a 'committee of the whole,' has never been accorded de facto labor organization status." Id.
136. 230 N.L.R.B. 275 (1977), enforced in part sub. nom. NLRB v. Silver
Spur Casino, 623 F.2d 571 (9th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 451 U.S. 906 (1981).
137. Id. at 276 (noting that the Council did not so much deal with management as it dealt for management in performing a management function).
138. 231 N.L.R.B. 1108 (1977).
139. Id. at 1121 (finding that the presence of a management representative
of the grievant's choice on the Committee was not indicative of 'dealings' with
management since the manager's vote would be bound by the decision of the

majority).
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approval. Cabot Carbon's broad definition of a "labor organization," which effectively could be manipulated to encompass
almost any type of employee committee, has been revised by
the NLRB. The revised definition allows exceptions for committees that do not act as agents of the employees, that is, in
a representative capacity, and for committees which have authority independent from the employer. The objective Cabot
Carbon standard has also been challenged by a subjective
test in the Sixth Circuit which recognizes that while employer domination may be objectively ascertainable, the identification of a labor organization requires reference to subjec-.
tive factors.
D.

Electromation and E.I. du Pont: The NLRB Rules on
the Legality of Cooperation Committees
1.

Electromation

In Electromation,140 the company, a (then) non-unionized
electronic components manufacturer employing approximately 200 persons, experienced financial losses and created
five action committees 141 as a means of involving employees
42
in the attendant process of cutting labor expenses.1
Although the employees were not enthusiastic about the idea,
they accepted it as the best possible solution under the circumstances. 43 According to management, the role of the employee committee members was to act as a conduit between
management and the other employees on the respective com140. 309 N.L.R.B. 990 (1992), enforced, Electromation, Inc. v. NLRB, 1994
U.S. App. LEXIS 25612 (7th Cir. Sept. 15, 1994).
141. An action committee was created for each of the following issues: (1)
Absenteeism/Infractions; (2) No Smoking Policy; (3) Communication Network;
(4) Pay Progression for Premium Positions; and, (5) Attendance Bonus Program. Id. at 991.
142. Id. The company cut expenses by distributing an annual lump payment
based on seniority instead of wage increases as well as by changing its policy of
awarding bonuses based on attendance. Id. at 990. Employees petitioned management to express their disappointment with the policy changes in response to
which the company met with a group of eight employees, who were either randomly selected or had affirmatively requested permission to attend the meeting,
to discuss the problems. Id. Following this meeting, the company's president
again met with other members of management and concluded that unilateral
management action would no longer satisfy the employees and that the best
course was to involve employees in solving the problems whereupon the "action
committees" were established. Id. at 991.
143. Id.
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mittee topics. 14 4 Management determined the composition of

each committee, its responsibilities and goals, the meeting
dates, the topics of discussion, and also provided the materials and location for the meetings. 145 Employees were paid for
their participation, and a member of management was present at every meeting "to facilitate the discussions."146 After
the employer
the commencement of an organizational drive,
147
committees.
the
with
discontinued working
The NLRB found first that the committees were labor organizations within the meaning of section 2(5) because: (1)
employees participated on the committees; (2) the activities of
the committees constituted "dealings" with the employer
since proposals were submitted and would have been implemented but for the onset of the union campaign; (3) the subject matter of the committees generally consisted of conditions of employment; and (4) the committees acted in a
representational capacity. 14 8 The NLRB also found that the
employer had dominated the committees since it had formed
the committees despite employee ambivalence, defined the
functions and topics of the committees, contributed support,
and appointed management members to serve on the committees. 149 In conclusion, the NLRB determined that the purpose of the committees was not to enable cooperation to improve quality or efficiency, but to create the false impression
that employee demands were being met or at least considered.1 50 This sort of company unionism through unilateral
bargaining or "dealing" was the 1very problem which section
15
8(a)(2) was enacted to address.

Three members of the NLRB concurred with Chairman
Stephens' opinion, but wrote separately to propose less restrictive interpretations of the NLRA in order to allow for
greater latitude in labor-management cooperation. NLRB
144. Electromation, Inc., 309 N.L.R.B. 990, 991 (1992), enforced, Electromation, Inc. v. NLRB, 1994 U.S. App. LEXIS 25612 (7th Cir. Sept. 15, 1994).
145. Id.
146. Id.
147. Id. at 992.
148. Id. at 997.
149. Electromation, Inc., 309 N.L.R.B. 990, 998 (1992), enforced, Electromation, Inc. v. NLRB, 1994 U.S. App. LEXIS 25612 (7th Cir. Sept. 15, 1994).
These management controls were inconsistent with the structural independence required by Newport News. See supra part II.C.1.
150. Id.
151. Id.

1994]

LABOR-MANAGEMENT COOPERATION

249

Member Devaney's concurrence 1 52 emphasized the representative nature of a labor organization, such that a joint labormanagement committee would unlawfully impede the employees' free choice of a bargaining representative. 153 NLRB
Member Clifford R. Oviatt, Jr.'s concurrence15 4 recommended
an exception to the rule for joint committees addressing "significant productivity and efficiency problems in the workplace" since these subjects are outside the usual topics of bargaining.155 NLRB Member John Neil Raudabaugh proposed
a four-part test for determining the nature of a joint labormanagement committee. 1 56 The factors of the four-part test
included the assessment of (1) the extent of the employer's
involvement; (2) whether the employees objectively perceive
the joint committee as a substitute for traditional collective
bargaining; (3) whether the employees have been assured of
their section 7 right to representation and collective bargaining; and (4) the employer's motive in establishing the committee.1 5 7 Electromation, Inc. appealed this decision but the
Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals enforced the decision on
September 15, 1994.158
2.

E.I. du Pont

In E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Co.,159 the company unilaterally instituted seven committees to address fitness and
safety issues at the 3500-employee chemical plant without
152. Id. at 998-1003 (Devaney, M., concurring).
153. Id. at 990, 999 (Devaney, M., concurring).
154. Electromation, Inc., 309 N.L.R.B. 990, 1003-05 (1992) (Oviatt, M., concurring), enforced, Electromation, Inc. v. NLRB, 1994 U.S. App. LEXIS 25612
(7th Cir. Sept. 15, 1994).
155. Id.
156. Id. at 1005-15 (Raudabaugh, M., concurring).
157. Id. at 1013 (Raudabaugh, M., concurring).
158. Electromation v. NLRB, 1994 U.S. App. LEXIS 25612 (7th Cir. Sept. 15,
1994). Counsel for Electromation argued during the September 27, 1993, hearing that the subjective wishes of the employees who participate in the committees should factor into the analysis of the legality of the committees and that
the NLRB's conclusion undermines employees' freedom of choice. See Randall
Samborn, Seventh Circuit Panel Hears ElectromationAppeal, NAT'L L.J., Oct.
11, 1993, at 17. The Seventh Circuit did not address the issue of whether modern labor-management cooperation groups were unlawful under the NLRA
since it found that the NLRA's determination was supported by substantial evidence and its legal conclusions were reasonably based in the law. Electromation v. NLRB, 1994 U.S. App. LEXIS 25612, *68-*75 (7th Cir. Sept. 15, 1994).
159. 311 N.L.R.B. 893 (1993).
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negotiating with the incumbent union. 16 0 Once again, the
main question, for the purpose of finding whether the committees were "labor organizations," was whether they were
16 1
"dealing" with the employer under the Cabot Carbon test.
E.I. du Pont broadly defined the term "dealing" to mean a
"bilateral mechanism" which entails a pattern or practice of
proposals to management, although no compromise on either
side is required.16 2 The NLRB held that isolated instances of
proposals to management did not count as "dealing," nor did
"brainstorming" sessions, information3 sharing, or individual
communications with management. 16
The employer's control over the committees assured a
finding that it dominated the committees.16 This control
was demonstrated by management's participation in committee decision-making, formation of one of the committees, determination of committee agendas and topics for discussion,
determination of the number of employees on each committee
and selection of employee participants on the committees if
the number of volunteers exceeded the number of available
spaces. 1 65 Further, the management could "change or abolish
any of the committees at will."1 6 6 The near complete lack of
independent structure resulting in virtual employer control
of the committee constituted a perfect illustration of the Newport News standard for employer domination of the formation
of a labor organization under NLRA secand administration
16 7
tion 8(a)(2).
Chairman Stephens, the author of the Electromation decision, was recused from participating in this decision, and
only NLRB Member Devaney wrote separately in concurrence. NLRB Member Devaney diverged from his colleagues
160. Id. at 900 (Devaney, M., concurring).
161. Id. at 894.
162. Id.
163. Id.
164. E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Co., 311 N.L.R.B. 893, 895-96 (1993).
165. Id. at 895-96.
166. Id. at 896.
167. Id. The NLRB held that E.I. du Pont did not violate NLRA § 8(a)(5) by
holding safety conferences since these conferences were mere "brainstorming"
sessions in which suggestions and ideas regarding safety were discussed. This
did not constitute bilateral "dealing" with the employer since the conferences
were not meant to establish proposals. Id. Further, the conferences did not
address bargainable matters and it was made clear that such matters should be
handled through the union. Id.
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by subscribing to a narrower interpretation of "labor organization," allowing significant opportunity for labor-management cooperation efforts to serve as management tools so
long as the committees did not usurp the role of a labor organization by purporting to represent employees in bargaining with the employer. 168 Under this theory, the chief evil
sought to be eradicated by section 8(a)(2) was employer manipulation of labor-management cooperation efforts "so that
they appear to be agents and representatives of the employees when in fact they are not" which would undermine em1 69 Thus, a
ployee free choice in choosing a bargaining agent.
labor-management cooperation committee would not be unlawful, even if dominated by the employer, unless it acted in
a representational capacity. The concurrence contended that
the majority's definition of "dealing with" as a bilateral mechanism of proposal submission by committees and acceptance
by management was tantamount to "bargaining with" and so
unlawfully acting as
the E.I. du Pont committees were thus
1 70
committees.
representation
employee
E.I. du Pont did not appeal this decision and has abolished the offending committees. 171 The company's managing
counsel has stated that "it's not formalized committees that
make us 2 more competitive, but . . . self-managed work
17
teams."
3.

Summary

In Electromation and E.I. du Pont, the NLRB rigorously
applied the traditional two-part test (domination/labor organization) to obliging facts and, not surprisingly, found 8(a)(2)
168. Id. at 898-900 (Devaney, M., concurring).
169. E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Co., 311 N.L.R.B. 893, 899-900 (Devaney,
M., concurring).
170. Id. at 902 n.10 (Devaney, M., concurring). NLRB Member Devaney differentiated "dealing with" and "bargaining with" by reference to the legislative
history of the NLRA, showing that NLRA § 2(5) was worded so as to include
false bargaining as well as bargaining. Id. See the testimony of William Green
referenced by Member Devaney in Electromation: "[Flew of the company union
plans in themselves pretend to be an agency for collective bargaining. Show me
a company union through which a wage agreement... has ever been consummated. Never one." To Create a National Labor Board: Hearings on S. 2926
Before the Senate Comm. on Education and Labor, 73d Cong., 2nd Sess. 72
(1934) (statement of William Green, President of the American Federation of
Labor), reprinted in 1 LEGIS. HIsT.-NLRA, supra note 22, at 102.
171. See Samborn, supra note 13, at 1.
172. Id.
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violations. In both cases, the committees were clearly labor
organizations since they acted in a representational capacity
regarding conditions of employment. The employer dominated the committees by controlling significant aspects concerning the formation of the committees and the conduct of
meetings. Given these facts, evocative of company unionism,
the NLRB must have felt little need to narrow the 8(a)(2)
standards that had been observed, with few exceptions, since
the NLRA was enacted. The concurring members in both
cases suggested alternative tests which would recognize valid
labor-management cooperation while continuing to restrict
sham unions, in their modern guises, by refocusing the inquiry from the traditional employer domination/labor organization test to whether the role of the union had actually been
threatened or usurped.
Despite this, the NLRB did provide further clarification
of the Cabot Carbon "dealing with employers" standard for
labor organizations by explaining it as a "bilateral mechanism" in which proposals are submitted by employees as a
group and accepted by management. Unfortunately, this
clarification provides no exception for legitimate labor-management cooperation efforts, many of which, because of their
joint nature and the need for mutual communication and contribution, simply do not qualify as unilateral mechanisms.
III.

ANALYSIS OF PROPOSALS

A.

Opposing Perspectives on Labor-Management
Cooperation
In general, the current theory supporting labor-management cooperation is that labor and management now, more
than in times past, have common interests, namely counteracting the dual threats of foreign competition and a destabilized employment relationship. 1 73 Beginning in the late
1970's, interest in labor-management cooperation grew exponentially as American businesses began experimenting with
methods to increase productivity so as to remain globally
competitive. 174 During this same period of time, union mem173. See generally GOULD, supra note 10, at 11-17; Stephen I. Schlossberg &
Steven M. Fetter, U.S. Labor Law and the Future of Labor-Management Cooperation, 3 LAB. LAW. 11, 17 (1987); Randolph M. Hale, The New IndustrialRelations in a Global Economy, 37 LAB. L.J. 539 (1986).
174. See BLUESTONE & BLUESTONE, supra note 2, at 146.
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bership had declined contemporaneously with the decline in
manufacturing and industrial work, and the rise in the percentage of service sector jobs less amenable to unionization. 1 7 5 One general result of these trends was a marked de176 In
crease in the stability of the employment relationship.
clarifying the standards for a lawful labor-management cooperative effort, it is necessary to remember that the Supreme
Court has remarked that "Congress had no expectation that
the elected union representative would become an equal partner in the running of the business enterprise in which the
77 Realistically then, current
union members are employed."
labor-management cooperation efforts are primarily an ecoameliorative social
nomic management tool with secondary
78
employees.1
for
benefits
and economic
1.

Overview of Theories of Labor-Management
Cooperation

Labor-management cooperation efforts vary depending
on the context of the workplace in which they are enacted, as
well as on the different theories and models of labor-management cooperation in use.' 79 "Cooperation" can denote anything from unilateral methods, such as suggestion boxes and
employee opinion surveys, to co-management of the business
by employees.' 0 However, the very term "labor-management
cooperation" presupposes some significant degree of mutual
communication and contact between management and labor.
Further, labor-management cooperation efforts are almost always initiated and supported to some degree by management
175. See id., supra note 2, at 4-5; GOULD, supra note 10, at 110.
176. See GOULD, supra note 10, at 259-60.
177. First Natl Maintenance Corp. v. NLRB, 452 U.S. 666, 676 (1981).
178. One commentator has noted that the origins of labor-management cooperation are based on a "moral issue of equality" between labor and management
rather than a means to achieve an economic end. E.g., Thomas C. Kohler, Models of Worker Participation:The Uncertain Significance of Section 8(a)(2), 27
B.C. L. REV. 499, 501 (1986). In the United States, however, labor-management
cooperation has always been perceived as a management theory and has come
to serve the purposes of management first whereas the European model of labor-management cooperation is based on socialist ideology which has permeated the law. See id. at 501 n.5.
179. See id. at 503-05.
180. See id. at 505-10.
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since they are most often to the immediate benefit of
management. 181

The context of the workplace plays a large part in determining the level and quality of cooperation. In addition to
the unionization factor, the context of the workplace also includes the type of work done and the structure and size of the
business. Several widely recognized "models" of labor-management cooperation have emerged based on a variety of theories which have been propounded over the course of the last
two decades. 182 Different "models" are associated with different types of workplaces and business enterprises. 183 Each of

these models provides employees some greater level of contribution to the success of the business, beyond the parameters
of their individual job classifications. 1 4 Such involvement
would rarely be available through the traditional collective
bargaining process. 1 5
2.

Union, Employer, and Employee Perspectives

Despite the widely touted advantages of labor-management cooperation, well-warranted skepticism remains on the
181. See id. at 546. Professor Kohler argues that while properly instituted
participatory programs can produce benefits for all the parties involved, they
should not be allowed to pose as an alternative to collective bargaining given
the conflict of interest presented by management involvement and control. Id.
at 547-48. Professor Kohler notes that, historically, "employer-sponsored alternatives to collective bargaining have not sufficed" because management retains
ultimate control. Id. at 550. Collective bargaining promotes independent employee association which, in turn, decreases reliance on government intervention in the employment relationship while promoting an organized political
voice for labor. Id. Thus, Professor Kohler concludes that collective bargaining
must be preserved by the vigilant enforcement of section 8(a)(2). Id. at 551.
This Comment agrees that the values of collective bargaining, including prohibition of company union-like constructs, must remain intact. However, this
comment argues that ignoring practical and well-tested solutions to modern
economic realities will ultimately work to the detriment of all parties, and that
a compromise position is possible.
182. Id. at 505-10. Professor Kohler identifies six commonly used models;
the quality circle, job enrichment programs, semi-autonomous teams, opinion
surveys, quality of work life programs, and the Scanlon Plan. Id.
183. See id. at 510-13.
184. Id.

185. See Barbara A. Lee, Collective Bargainingand Employee Participation:
An Anomalous Interpretationof the National Labor Relations Act, 38 LAB. L.J.
206, 207 (1987) (discussing union challenges to labor management cooperation
techniques characterizing employee participation as "managerial," thus placing
the participating employee outside the scope of coverage of union
representation).
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part of unions, employers, and employees. The legal constructs developed to address the inherent adversity of the
parties present a variety of impediments to labor-management cooperation, as do the entrenched historically opposed
interests of the parties. 18 6 It is important to understand the
concerns of the three main players in this developing area of
labor law in order to appreciate the impact of the proposed
resolutions.
Historical union opposition to company unions, the main
tools by which employers legally established dominion over
their employees prior to 1935,187 has fueled modern union
suspicions about the rationale behind many current labor8 The committees and
management cooperation efforts.1 8
teams established in the name of cooperation are viewed by
unions, frequently with good reason, as attempts to usurp the
189 The commitunion's role as the employees' representative.
tees in Electromation and E.I. du Pont are illustrative of the
types of ill-conceived labor-management efforts that appear
0
to be merely an end-run around the authority of the union. 19
In the non-union sector, committees established ostensibly to
promote labor-management cooperation are often no more
than managerial attempts to maintain a union-free workplace. 19 1 Although the Electromation committees were discontinued at the commencement of the organizational drive,
while in existence, they were found to have been labor organizations dominated by the employer, thus usurping the proper
role, and perhaps discouraging the existence, of a duly elected
union. 192 Union suspicions about labor-management cooperation are further fueled by the fact that these efforts are

186. See Schlossberg & Fetter, supra note 173, at 32-38 (discussing problems
arising from labor-management cooperation efforts and the exclusivity doctrine,
the duty to disclose information, the distinction between mandatory and permissive subjects of bargaining, and the duty of fair representation, among
others). See generally GOULD, supra note 10.
187. See supra part II.B.1.
188. See Schlossberg & Fetter, supra note 173, at 25.
189. See GOULD, supra note 10, at 110.
190. See generally Electromation, Inc., 309 N.L.R.B. 990 (1992), enforced,
Electromation, Inc. v. NLRB, 1994 U.S. App. LEXIS 25612 (7th Cir. Sept. 15,
1994); E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Co., 311 N.L.R.B. 893 (1993).
191. See GOULD, supra note 10, at 110.
192. Electromation,309 N.L.R.B at 998.
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by the employer, the union's tradinearly always initiated
3

tional adversary.

19

In addition to concerns shared by all parties about
whether labor-management cooperation is feasible or worth
the effort in a particular workplace, employers are generally
concerned about the usurpation of management prerogatives
by employees.19 4 Not only do labor-management cooperation
efforts require including employees in formulating traditional
management decisions regarding personnel functions, product quality, and the work setting, but negotiating these efforts with unions may require concessions to the union by
management. 195 Furthermore, many management experts
suspect that any legislative revision to allow for labor-management cooperation cannot be accomplished without concessionary revisions to other parts of the Act. 196 As with unions,
the employer's willingness to compromise on some level is required for the success of labor-management cooperation.
Employees also have several concerns about labor-management cooperation. First, employee involvement in "managerial" decisions may pose the danger of changing the status
of the individuals involved to the extent that they are no
longer covered by the NLRA. 19v Second, employee involvement may also threaten a violation of the exclusivity doctrine.198 Third, labor-management cooperation is primarily a
193. See Kohler, supra note 178, at 550.
194. See BLUESTONE & BLUESTONE, supra note 2 at 167. Bluestone also notes
a potential increase in costs associated with operating the committees, id. at
166, and that "management is often skeptical of labor's ability to co-manage the
workplace." Id. at 167.
195. Under First Nat'l Maintenance Corp. v. NLRB, 452 U.S. 666 (1981), certain decisions were found to be the prerogative of management and not subject
to mandatory bargaining. Id. at 670. Thus, employers would not be required to
bargain about employee involvement in these areas.
196. Professor Gould advocates that "such reforms should not be undertaken
independent of labor law amendments that give unions access to company property to engage in organizational campaigns and representative status even
when the majority rule is not provided-as well as other far-reaching reforms."
See GOULD, supra note 10, at 262.
197. NLRB v. Yeshiva Univ., 444 U.S. 672 (1980), established that university professors were not employees under the NLRA because of the "managerial" aspects of their jobs. Id. at 682. Managerial employees are excluded from
coverage under the NLRA in the wake of NLRB v. Bell Aerospace Co., 416 U.S.
267, 275 (1974), overruled in partby, NLRB v. Hendricks County Rural Electric
Membership Corp., 454 U.S. 170 (1981).
198. Section 159(a) states that "[rlepresentatives designated or selected for
the purposes of collective bargaining by the majority of the employees in a unit
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management tool, and the secondary economic and social
benefits for the employees may not materialize unless em199 Lastly, laborployee involvement is implemented fairly.
management cooperation may be used for no better purpose
than to mollify employees into believing that their concerns
2 °°
are actually being addressed.
3.

Summary

This brief survey of the general theories and competing
concerns regarding labor-management cooperation should
help to provide some context for the various proposals which
address this problem. Although the theory of labor-management cooperation is still in its nascent stage, overwhelming
support for the notion from employers and employees favors
providing the parties with a viable legal choice. However,
any revision to or reinterpretation of the current law will require compromise on all sides; the traditional adversaries,
unions and employers, will need to yield aspects of their historical privileges, and employees will need to recognize that
the benefits they derive from labor-management cooperation
are secondary to the success of the business enterprise which
makes such benefits possible.
B.

JudicialResolution

The first set of proposals analyzed are judicial resolutions. The assumption of the free choice theory of judicial resolution is that labor-management cooperation is still possible
20 1
under one or more alternative readings of the current law.
None of the proposed alternative readings, however, have
appropriate for such purposes, shall be the exclusive representatives of all the
employees in such unit for the purposes of collective bargaining." 29 U.S.C.
§ 159(a) (1988) (emphasis added).
199. It has been noted that employees may simply be asked to work harder
but not smarter, that the company may use the resulting efficiency gains to
reduce the workforce, and that such programs may foster dissension among factions of employees supporting and opposing the programs. See BLUESTONE &
BLUESTONE, supra note 2, at 167.
200. In E.I. du Pont, Member Devaney observed that this situation undermined the employee's free choice of a bargaining representative, E.I. du Pont de
Nemours & Co., 311 N.L.R.B. 893, 898 (1993), in that management was "on
both sides of the bargaining table." Id. at 903.
201. See generally Note, ParticipatoryManagement Under Sections 2(5) and
8(a)(2) of the NationalLabor Relations Act, 83 MICH. L. REv. 1736 (1985) [hereinafter ParticipatoryManagement].
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been accepted by the NLRB or validated by the U.S. Supreme
Court (as has the traditional two-part test), and probably will
not be, absent some Congressional imprimatur to depart from
the traditional adversarial system. This is especially true in
the wake of Electromation and E.I. du Pont, and given the
unresolved practical applications of the issue.2 °2 The assumption under the traditional theory of judicial resolution is
that the current law supports labor-management cooperation
efforts to the extent they are useful, and that judicial reinterpretation is contrary to the legislative history of the
20 3
NLRA.
1. The Cooperative Free Choice Interpretationsof the
NLRA
The traditional adversarial analysis leaves little opportunity for meaningful labor-management cooperation. Accordingly, alternative interpretations of the NLRA have developed in some of the circuit courts. The rationale behind these
alternative interpretations is that employees should be able
to freely choose, without government intervention via the
NLRB, the method by which they will be represented.20 4
This theory is developed in alternative interpretations of both
NLRA sections 8(a)(2) and 2(5).

202. See supra part III.A.
203. See generally Kohler, supra note 178; Note, Collective Bargainingas an
IndustrialSystem: An Argument Against JudicialRevision of Section 8(a)(2) of
the National Labor Relations Act, 96 HARv. L. REV. 1662 (1983) [hereinafter
Collective Bargaining].
204. See generally ParticipatoryManagement, supra note 201. The free
choice analysis assumes that the primary purpose of the NLRA was not the
prevention of industrial strife but the protection of employee rights and that
instead of adopting a purely adversarial system, the NLRA contemplated giving
employees a choice between cooperation or adversarial relations. Id. at 175960. Although legitimate labor-management cooperation is distinguishable from
company unions in their modern guises, such efforts are judged by the same set
of standards. Free choice judicial interpretations distinguish legitimate labormanagement cooperation efforts from modern day company unions by determining whether they serve a representative purpose as opposed to "those which
merely offer workers more control over and participation in managerial functions." Id. at 1768.
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2 5
a. The NLRA Section 8(a)(2) Subjective Test
The alternative interpretation of section 8(a)(2) allows
for greater latitude for labor-management cooperation by
adopting a subjective test, from the employees' perspective, to
6
determine employer domination.2" This test requires a
showing that the employer has interfered with the employees'
freedom of choice in order to distinguish cooperation from
domination. The subjective test is more narrow, in that actual domination, rather than the inference of domination,
must be demonstrated, a requirement which could prove
problematic in application. The subjective test further frustrates a finding of domination, even where justified, since, by
the time litigation begins, the labor-management cooperation
effort is already in place and employees may not recognize
that it was not freely chosen. Lastly, this test is inconsistent
with legislative history and has only the most tenuous link to
established precedent.2 °7
b. The NLRA Section 2(5) Labor Organization

Test
The Sixth Circuit has reinterpreted the term "labor organization" specifically to allow for labor-management cooperation if it resulted from the free choice of employees, even
2 °8
where there is objective evidence of employer domination.
In doing so, the court essentially rejected the holding of Cabot
Carbon.2 °9 While Cabot Carbon established a broad interpre205. See Chicago Rawhide Mfg. Co. v. NLRB, 221 F.2d 165 (7th Cir. 1955).
Note that the Electromation decision was enforced in the Seventh Circuit, the
same court which originated this test in 1955. Electromation v. NLRB, 1994
U.S. App. LEXIS 25612 (7th Cir., Sept. 15, 1994). In Electromation v. NLRB
the Seventh Circuit stated that, "an interpretation of Section 8(a)(2) which
would limit a court's focus to only the employees' subjective will, or which would
require a finding of employee dissatisfaction with the organization, is at odds
with the Supreme Court's holding in NLRB v. Newport News." Id. at *61-*62.
The court stated that Chicago Rawhide was distinguished from Electromation
on its facts since the employees initiated the labor-management process and
established its procedures, and their meetings were outside the presence of
management. Id. at *66.
206. See supra part II.C.2.
207. The legislative history of section 8(a)(2) is clearly concerned with maintaining a balance between adversaries, see suprapart II.B. 1, and Newport News
established clear precedent on the issue of domination. See supra part II.C.1.
208. See supra part II.C.4.
209. The Sixth Circuit attempted to distinguish Cabot Carbon by observing
that the Court had not identified the specific limits of the term "dealing" other
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tation of the "dealing with" clause of section 2(5) to promote
union autonomy and the preservation of the balance of power
between employees and employers, Streamway and Airstream attempt to narrow this interpretation to instances involving an "active, ongoing association between management
and employees."2 1 ° Other subjective and objective factors in
identifying a labor organization are suggested, as well as evidence of the employer's attempt to undermine the employees'
free choice. 2 1 1 For the same reasons as the subjective section
8(a)(2) test, the reinterpreted section 2(5) test is not well supported by legislative history.21 2 The legislative history is preoccupied with the elimination of company unions to promote
employee free choice, not with the promotion of employee free
choice to eliminate company unions.2 13 Further, in undercutting Cabot Carbon's broad definition of "dealing," this test
has only the most tenuous link to long-established precedent.
Generally, employers favor judicial resolution over the
8(a)(2) and 2(5) tests because it affords them greater freedom
to implement labor-management cooperation programs.21 4
However, judicial resolution efforts to allow for labor-management cooperation have been less than entirely successful. 21 5 There does not appear to be a united front on this
issue at the NLRB. The concurring NLRB members in
Electromation and E.L du Pont sought to allow for greater
labor-management cooperation by reinterpreting the term
"labor organization." 216 Further, the new Chairman of the
than to state the term included more than bargaining. NLRB v. Streamway
Div. of Scott & Fetzer Co., 691 F.2d 288, 291-92 (6th Cir. 1982). Thus, the circuit courts were free to make this definition themselves. Id. The facts of Cabot
Carbon were essentially the same as those in Streamway but the Streamway
court attempted to distinguish the two cases on the ground that the Cabot Carbon committee "involved a more active, ongoing association between management and employees." Id. at 294. Actually, the Streamway committee would
have continued to exist but for the NLRB's disestablishment order.
210. Id. at 294.
211. Airstream, Inc. v. NLRB, 877 F.2d 1291, 1295 (6th Cir. 1989); NLRB v.
Streamway Div. of Scott & Fetzer Co., 691 F.2d 288, 294 (6th Cir. 1982).
212. See supra part II.B.2.
213. See supra part II.B.2.
214. See Moskal, supra note 7, at 18.
215. Alternative tests have been developed in the First, Sixth, Seventh, and
Ninth Circuits, none of which has proceeded to the U.S. Supreme Court and all
of which rest on fairly shaky precedential ground and an unorthodox reading of
the legislative history of the NLRA. See supra, parts II.C.2 and II.C.4.
216. See supra notes 152-58, 168-70 and accompanying text.
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NLRB, William B. Gould IV, is strongly in favor of promoting
labor-management cooperation through these alternative judicial resolutions or legislative revisions patterned after
them.

2 17

2.

The TraditionalAdversarial Interpretationof the
NLRA

According to the traditional adversarial model, the primary goal underlying the passage of the NLRA was the prevention of industrial strife, not the promotion of employee
free choice. 2 18 This goal was accomplished by establishing a
system in which the adversarial relations of the parties could
219 Thus, promotion of embe resolved relatively peaceably.
ployee associational rights was the means for reaching the
primary goal of resolving industrial strife, rather than the
end itself. Proponents of this view argue that the framework
of collective bargaining provides the only viable opportunity
220 This view rests on two
for labor-management cooperation.
assumptions. First, it assumes that labor and management
22
are inherent adversaries. ' Second, it assumes that effective
collective bargaining requires that each party maintain its
autonomy so that the balance of power is not skewed so as to
2 2 2 Section 8(a)(2) assures this autonlead to industrial strife.
omy "by requiring that labor relations be conducted only by
organizations capable of engaging in arm's-length bargaining."22 3 The argument follows that if this is no longer the
case, then Congress should revise the statute and the NLRB
217. See GOULD, supra note 10, at 262 ("The reforms can be undertaken both
through Board and judicial interpretations of the statute as well as congressional amendments to it."); see also William B. Gould IV, Reflections on Workers'
Participation,Influence and Powersharing:The Future of IndustrialRelations,
58 U. CiNc. L. REV. 381, 385 (1989).
218. See Collective Bargaining,supra note 203, at 1673.
219. See NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1 (1937) (holding
that the NLRA is constitutional because of its purpose of promoting industrial
peace to protect interstate commerce); S. REP. No. 573, 74th Cong., 1st Sess. 1
(1935), reprinted in 2 LEGIS. HiST.-NLRA, supra note 22, at 2300 ("The first
objective of the bill is to promote industrial peace.").
220. See Kohler, supra note 178. "What the term worker participation (and
industrial democracy) meant to the framers of the Act ... is clear: collective
bargaining." Id. at 548.
221. See Collective Bargaining,supra note 203, at 1677-78. See also, Kohler,
supra note 178, at 515.
222. See Collective Bargaining,supra note 203, at 1674-76.
223. Id. at 1678.
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and the courts should not construe the statute in a way that
22 4
is inconsistent with its stated purpose.

The need to maintain union independence and autonomy
from the employer is crucial to the traditional adversary interpretation, because it allows employees to engage in armslength bargaining with their employer. 22 5 The rigorous appli-

cation of the two-part test (employer domination/labor organization) ensures that employers will not usurp the role of the
union by establishing a company union in its place. According to this theory, company unionism continues to thrive in
the form of labor-management committees which are inconsistent with the basic purpose of the NLRA because they purport to serve the same purpose as a union, albeit under management control.226 Further, it is correctly noted that the
rationale behind these new "company unions" originates with
management, and, while not necessarily overtly hostile towards employee rights as in earlier times, is primarily for the
economic benefit of the company with secondary benefits for
the employees.227
Certain limited types of labor-management cooperation
have, however, been identified as being compatible with the
collective bargaining model. The NLRB has narrowed its
broad definition of a "labor organization" by finding two exceptions to the rule in circumstances that suggest some resolve to promote labor-management cooperation. 2 28 Further-

more, as discussed in E.I. du Pont, certain unilateral
mechanisms, such as "brainstorming" groups, suggestion
224. See id. at 1680-81. "Major revision of a social compact such as the Act is
a job for Congress, not for the courts." Id. at 1680.
225. See id. at 1674-76.
226. See Kohler, supra note 178, at 548. Professor Kohler concludes that
several popular forms of labor-management cooperation (joint worker-management bodies, semi-autonomous teams) constitute labor organizations due to
their inevitable dealing with the employer and are dominated by the employer
because of their lack of structural independence. Id. at 535-45.
227. See id. at 547. "[P]articipative theories have been formulated on management's behalf and are intended to secure worker cooperation and identity
with the goals and directives of their employers." Id. "As the experience of
every industrialized nation reveals, managements' [sic] control of the order of
the employment relationship has not been a regime acceptable to most workers
....Employer-sponsored alternatives to collective bargaining have not sufficed
because under them, management retains ultimate control of the order of the
relationship." Id. at 550.
228. See supra part II.C.5 (discussing the NLRB-sanctioned agency and delegation exceptions).
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boxes, information sharing, and other individual communications with management, are lawful forms of labor-management cooperation.2

29

Lastly, it is acknowledged that,

"[u]nder the right conditions," if a union is present, labormanagement cooperation efforts can be beneficial so long as
management acknowledges the union's role as representative.23 0 Thus, some limited cooperative efforts may still be

viable under the traditional interpretation of the NLRA.
The traditional adversarial view disapproves of the more
"cooperative" forms of labor-management cooperation and of
judicial attempts to resolve the issue. The Electromation and
E.I. du Pont decisions are consistent with this view given the
straightforward application of the two-part test. For obvious
reasons, unions generally favor this view because of the support it lends their traditional role. But employers who wish
to implement some form of labor-management cooperation
are faced with a confusing variety of judicial interpretations
exist in addition to the traditional
of the NLRA 23 that
1
interpretation.

C. Legislative Resolution
Given the widespread support for, and success of, labormanagement cooperation efforts and the unlikelihood of judicial resolution in the wake of Electromationand E.I. du Pont,
the inevitable option is legislative resolution. Several alternatives exist. One alternative that has been suggested is the
complete repeal of section 8(a)(2). Another alternative is the
revision of either section 8(a)(2) or section 2(5), allowing for a
more modern understanding of unlawful domination of labor
organizations. These alternatives are explored below.
1. Repeal of NLRA Section 8(a)(2)
The argument for the repeal of section 8(a)(2) rests on
the assumption that labor-management cooperation and the
legislative principles that underlie section 8(a)(2) are entirely incompatible and cannot be synthesized within the pro229. E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Co., 311 N.L.R.B. 893, 894 (1993).
230. See Kohler, supra note 178, at 527.
231. See Beaver, supra note 35, at 237.
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*
232
vision.
The argument for repeal is supported by a traditional reading of the NLRA and a rejection of the free-choice

judicial resolution analysis. 233 Another assumption underly-

ing the repeal argument is that the benefits of section 8(a)(2)
are outweighed by the burdens imposed by obstructing labormanagement cooperation.23 4 The repeal argument concludes
that section 8(a)(2) could be eliminated from the NLRA altogether and that section 8(a)(1) would provide sufficient protection for employees from actual employer domination. 235
Section 8(a)(2) was enacted specifically to eliminate the
prevalent problems associated with company unions.236 The
primary threat posed by company unions was the appearance
of impartial representation which threatened any meaningful
opportunity for collective bargaining. 2 7 Although many supporters of labor-management cooperation insist that the company union no longer exists,238 cases such as E.I. du Pont and
Electromation, with their representational committees, prove
otherwise. It is somewhat naive to believe that a grudgingly
acknowledgment of the need for labor-management cooperation efforts will eliminate partisan impulses and automatically result in harmonious cooperation on all levels. Obviously, the adversarial nature of labor-management relations
perseveres despite the recent realization of some common interests brought on by external forces. Labor-management efforts should be acknowledged as a management tool, which
has the potential to be abused to the detriment of employees.
Section 8(a)(2) should remain substantially intact in order to continue to counteract the very abuse it was designed

to prevent. 23 9 Section 8(a)(1) 24 0 cannot adequately address

232. See Shaun G. Clarke, Note, Rethinking the Adversarial Model in Labor
Relations:An Argument for Repeal of Section 8(a)(2), 96 YALE L.J. 2021, 203841 (1987).
233. See id. at 2034-38.
234. See GOULD, supra note 10, at 153; Clarke, supra note 232, at 2044-49
(examining beneficial social and economic implications of repeal).
235. See Clarke, supra note 232, at 2040-41. "Employer domination or coercion would clearly 'interfere with' and 'restrain' employees, and would thus violate section 8(a)(1)." Id. at 2041.
236. See supra part II.B.1.
237. See supra part II.A.
238. See Gould, supra note 217, at 384 (1989); see also ParticipatoryManagement, supra note 201, at 1749.
239. See Schlossberg & Fetter, supra note 173, at 25 (arguing that there is
an obvious need to preserve genuine prohibitions on company unions "and to
proscribe the use by unscrupulous employers of spurious cooperative or partici-
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the ongoing problem of company unions. Employer domination of a labor organization could easily be characterized as
interfering with, restraining, or coercing employees in the exercise of their section 7 rights under section 8(a)(1); but so
could the three other section 8(a) unlawful employer activities,2 4 1 for which reason section 8(a)(1) is a derivative claim
4 2 The other section 8(a) violations reunder each of them.2
tain their primary status because of the essentially adversarial nature of the labor-management relations and because
of the continuing categories of abuses which make specific
reference to them necessary. Such is the case with section
8(a)(2). The acknowledgment of the mutual need for some cooperation in the workplace does not signal an end to the inherently adversarial relations between labor and
management.
2. Legislative Revision of NLRA Section 8(a)(2)
The proponents of revising section 8(a)(2) argue that
even if certain judicial resolutions are supportable, the rigorous enforcement of the traditional test by the NLRB and the
majority of the circuit courts makes legislative revision the
best option.2 4 3 Other proponents argue that the judicial resolutions are not supportable and that legislative revision of
2 4 4 Either way, any proposal
section 8(a)(2) is the only option.
for revision should examine the judicial resolutions as the
policy road maps to successful legislative resolution.
at union
pative schemes conceived as means to defeat legitimate efforts
organization.").
an
240. This section provides that, "It shall be an unfair labor practice for
exercise of
employer- to (1) interfere with, restrain, or coerce employees in the
the[ir] rights guaranteed in section [7] .... " 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(1) (1988).
241. These sections provide that,
It shall be an unfair labor practice for an employer... (3) by discrimination in regard to hire or tenure of employment
or any term or condition of employment to encourage or discourage
membership in any labor organization... ;
(4) to discharge or otherwise discriminate against an employee because he has filed charges or given testimony under this
subchapter;
(5) to refuse to bargain collectively with the representatives of his
employees, subject to the provisions of section [9(a)]....
Id. §§ 158(a)(3)-(5).
242. See, e.g., SMrrH et al., supra note 49, at 76.
243. See GOULD, supra note 10, at 140-41.
244. See Collective Bargaining,supra note 203, at 1680-81.
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Judicial resolution of section 8(a)(2) calls for two things:
a finding of actual domination by the employer based on a
subjective test from the employees' point of view; and an assessment, based on the facts, of the employer's motives. 245
The application of this theory to section 8(a)(2) would require
a showing of actual domination, a subjective and fact-based
standard.2 46 Accordingly, such a revision would excise most
of the illustrative terms in section 8(a)(2) to eliminate objec24 7
tive standards for judging labor-management cooperation.
This revision allows for the worst of both worlds. By rendering the provision ineffective for application in actual domination cases, it also leaves the broad term "labor organization" which could continue to eliminate a number of labormanagement cooperation efforts. Even worse, such a revision
would surely require major employer concessions, such as the
passage of legislation requiring that employers not replace
striking employees,2 48 which would make the bill unpalatable
to the business community and thus further impede its passage. Lastly, such a revision would require a case by case
assessment of the subjective state of mind of the employer
and the employees, placing a huge burden on the NLRB and
the court system and leaving no clear standards for employers to follow.
3. Legislative Revision of NLRA Section 2(5)
As with proposals to revise section 8(a)(2), a proposal to
revise the definition of a "labor organization" assumes that
judicial resolution is not supportable. Furthermore, such a
245. See supra part II.C.2.

246. Under the subjective test, interference with the formation, NLRB v.
Northeastern Univ., 601 F.2d 1208, 1211 (1st Cir. 1979), or administration,
Hertzka & Knowles v. NLRB, 503 F.2d 625, 629 (9th Cir. 1974), of a labor or-

ganization need not be unlawful, any more than contributing financial or other
support, NLRB v. Homemaker Shops, Inc., 724 F.2d 535, 546 (6th Cir. 1984).
247. Such a revision to section 8(a) could read as follows: It shall be an un-

fair libor practice for an employer(2) to dominate cr interfcr with the fc-mnatin zr admrAristwratifn zf
any labor organization cr .nti.but. finenial
. .
or th. upp t t it:
-ided, That 9ubjzt to rdiesa nd regulatiefts made end published by
the Beard ptwsuant to seeticr. 6, an emplcyer shall net be prehibitzd
frem permnitting employees teccnfcr with Ms~ emplzyer dluriag vwcrking
heurs wt heit les f t mc er pay. Proof of such domination requires a
subjective showing of both anti-union motive on the part of the employer and employee disfavor.
248. See S.55, 103d Cong., 1st Sess. (1993).
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proposal assumes that revision or repeal of section 8(a)(2) is
unnecessarily drastic given that, as one commentator has observed, and as legislative history proves, this section is the
"cornerstone" of the NLRA.24 9 Clearly, the sticking point in
defining unlawful employer domination has been the definition of a labor organization, and not the identification of
domination.2 5 ° Once again, an examination of the policies developed in the alternative judicial resolutions provides a road
map for proposed revision.
Generally, the alternative judicial interpretations of section 2(5) have emphasized the representative qualities of a
"labor organization" in an attempt to narrow the definition.
Under Cabot Carbon, "dealing" means more than bargaining,
but according to the alternative judicial resolutions which established the outer limits of this definition, it is no more than
representation, and is not an unlimited proscription against
25 1 The
communication between employers and employees.
NLRB has allowed limited exceptions to the broad definition
of a labor organization for committees that do not act as
agents of the employees, or where the committees act for
2 5 2 Both of
management, rather than with management.
these exceptions constitute non-representative action. The
Sixth Circuit interpretation further refines the term "dealing" in section 2(5) to allow for interaction between management and labor which is no more than a communication device, not active and ongoing, nor a vehicle for
representation.2 5 3
Thus, a revision to section 2(5) consistent with these interpretations would incorporate this narrower, but still obscure, definition of a "labor organization," possibly by specifically stating that the term shall not include labormanagement committees which do act in a representational
capacity. However, such a revision to section 2(5) would not
249. Kohler, supra note 178, at 518.
250. Domination is more readily objectively ascertainable, despite the proposition that it must be subjectively proven, whereas despite nearly 60 years of
trying, the definition of a labor organization is still clouded by theory. Indeed,
the Newport News Court had no trouble concluding that the committee had
been dominated, but it passed on the issue of whether the committee itself was
acceptable, leaving the issue to Congress. NLRB v. Newport News, Shipbuilding & Drydock Co., 308 U.S. 241, 251 (1939).
251. See supra part II.C.4.
252. See supra part II.C.5.
253. See supra part II.C.5.
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necessarily be consistent with the application of the term in
other sections of the NLRA. Accordingly, the better strategy
is to concentrate on section 8(a)(2), the source of the challenges to labor-management cooperation.
IV.

PROPOSAL-AMENDMENT OF

NLRA SECTION 8(a)(2)

Some commentators have attempted to provide guidelines for lawful labor-management cooperation efforts in light
of current judicial developments.254 Most recently, in the
wake of the Electromation decision, an article proposed a list
of common sense precautionary measures to ensure labormanagement cooperation efforts the best opportunity to resist
challenge. 255 In 1990, the United Nations Association of the
United States Economic Policy Council proposed thirteen "generic principles" for the lawful promotion of labor-manage256
ment cooperation.
254. Compare, e.g., Lee, supra note 185, at 219 with Zucker & Davis-Clarke,
supra note 23, at 34. During the seven year period between the two articles,
different issues and emphases have come to the fore, although several obvious
themes remain the same. For instance, where a union is present, the employer
would be well advised to negotiate labor-management cooperation efforts with
the employees via their collective bargaining representative so as not to usurp
the role of the union. And in the absence of an elected union, the establishment
of labor-management cooperation committees is governed by the need to avoid
creating labor organizations.
255. Steven H. Winterbauer, When Things Aren't What They Seem: Labor
Issues in the Nonunion Workplace, 20 EMPLOYEE REL. L.J. 189 (1994). The article proposed the following measures:
-The employer [may propose] the EPP [Employee Participation Plan]
but at the outset [should make] clear that employee participation [is]
not mandatory;
-Managers do not participate in the EPP. Alternatively, if managers
do participate, which standing alone does not violate the NLRA, the
committee is governed by majority rule and managers do not constitute
an majority;
-Employee participation is by way of open enrollment. The employer
does not limit or select nonmanagerial membership;
-The EPP selects its own chair and determines its own agenda;
-the employees participate on a nonrepresentational basis;
-The employer prohibits discussion of subjects of mandatory bargaining such as grievances, wages, hours, and conditions of work;
-The employer makes clear to employees that the EPPs are not intended to be a substitute for the employees right to organize and bargain collectively.
Id. at 214.
256. U.S. DEPT. OF LABOR, BUREAU OF LABOR-MANAGEMENT RELATIONS AND
COOPERATIVE PROGRAMS (1990). These included employee involvement in the
development of the program, a genuine long-term corporate commitment to the

1994]

LABOR-MANAGEMENT

COOPERATION

269

Despite these clarifications and others, a great deal of
confusion remains on the part of employees as well as employers about the legal requirements of labor-management
cooperation.257 However, a joint bipartisan proposal, the
Teamwork for Employees and Management Act [hereinafter
TEAM], to amend section 8(a)(2) was introduced in the House
and the Senate in 1993.258 The introduction of the bipartisan

proposal explicitly recognized the need for labor-management
cooperation. 25 9 The proposal attempted to allow for labor-

management cooperation efforts while placating the various
concerns of unions, management and employees. The proposal was also substantively the same as the proposed amendment that was rejected during the Taft-Hartley amendments
of 1947.260

Instead of revising the existing language of either section
8(a)(2) or section 2(5), this proposal would amend section
8(a)(2) by adding a further provision recognizing labor-management cooperation efforts as lawful.261 It also understandprogram, voluntary worker participation, a focus on employee needs, participative management, training programs, a supportive corporate atmosphere, union
involvement where a union is present, and the promotion of job security and
advancement.
257. See 139 CONG. REC. S4013 (daily ed. Mar. 30, 1993) (introductory statement of Sen. Kassebaum on joint resolution entitled Teamwork for Employees
and Management Act of 1993).
258. See S. 669, 103d Cong., 1st Sess. (1993); see also H.R. 1529, 103d Cong.,
1st Sess. (1993).
259. The stated purpose of TEAM is to:
1) protect legitimate employee involvement structures against governmental interference;
2) preserve existing protections against deceptive, coercive employer
practices; and
3) permit legitimate employee involvement structures where workers
may discuss issues involving terms and conditions of employment, to
continue to evolve and proliferate.
See 139 CONG. REc. S4013 (daily ed. Mar. 30, 1993) (statement of Sen.
Kassebaum).
260. See supra part II.B.3; see also supra note 73 (containing text of the rejected amendment). This amendment was originally rejected because it was
thought to be redundant and unnecessary given minor concessions on the issue
of labor-management communication in section 9(a). There was no premium
placed on labor-management communications at the time given the comparatively recent spectre of company unions. Obviously, times have changed.
261. Both bills contain substantially the same amending language:
Provided further, That it shall not constitute or be evidence of an unfair labor practice under this paragraph for an employer to establish,
assist, maintain, or participate in any organization or entity of any
kind, in which employees participate, to discuss matters of mutual in-
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ably would attempt to circumvent the fact-based subjective
test carved out by the alternative judicial resolutions, by simply defining an acceptable labor-management cooperation organization as one which addresses matters of mutual interest
to employers and employees, and distinguishing such an organization from a section 2(5) labor organization by emphasizing its absolute lack of representative capacity. The proposed amendment would leave the proscription against
domination intact, while revising the definition of a labor organization consistent with the judicial resolutions, and confining the reach of the definition to the issue of domination.
In practice, the domination test remains as a guarantee that
the parties will continue to bargain at arms length. However, the amendment would acknowledge the existence of
other issues of mutual interest, and recognize the legality of
employer-employee groups that address issues of quality, productivity, efficiency, and the like.
The proposed amendment would address union concerns
about continuing employer efforts to dominate labor organizations, and also management concerns about having to
make concessionary revisions to other parts of the NLRA in
exchange for union concessions on this issue. Employee concerns regarding the exclusivity doctrine would be addressed
by leaving section 2(5) intact and providing an exception only
regarding the issue of domination. Employee concerns about
the improper use of labor-management cooperation efforts
would be met by leaving section 8(a)(2) intact. Employee concerns about their protected status under the NLRA, as well
as other legal inconsistencies arising from the limited implementation of cooperation in a traditionally adversarial relationship, would have to be addressed separately. In addition,
a legislative amendment to section 8(a)(2) would demonstrate
Congressional imprimatur of labor-management cooperation

terest, including issues of quality, productivity and efficiency, and
which does not have, claim, or seek authority to negotiate or enter into
collective bargaining agreements with the employer or to amend existing collective bargaining agreements between the employer and any
labor organization.
Compare S. 669, 103d Cong., 1st Sess. (1993); H.R. 1529, 103d Cong., 1st Sess.
(1993) with H.R. 3020, 80th Cong., 1st Sess. § 8(d)(3) (1947), reprinted in 1
LEGIS. HiST.-LMRA, supra note 72, at 56, supra note 73.
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ease the way for future interpretation of these
efforts and
2
issues.

26

V.

CONCLUSION

Given the increasingly competitive nature of the marketplace and a better educated workforce more capable of coming
to its own decisions, employers and employees should be able
to choose whether or not to implement a labor-management
cooperation program. Legislative history, as well as the Electromation and E.L du Pont cases, signal the dubious
probability of successful judicial resolution. Additionally,
practical exigencies militate against some of the proposed legislative revisions. This leaves a legislative amendment as the
only viable recourse. The publicity surrounding Electroma263
tion and E.I. du Pont may expedite legislative amendment.
The proposed legislative amendment maintains the protections already in place while supporting future labor-management cooperation efforts. The need for labor-management cooperation will only grow with the increase in both global
competition and the non-unionized sector and the resultant
unstable employment relationships. Amending legislation
that was enacted in a different era, when the United States
was industrially preeminent, is the appropriate response to
these modern requirements.
Audrey Anne Smith

262. NLRB Member Raudabaugh has remarked, "[ilf you don't like the result, it's up to Congress to change it." Roger S. Kaplan & Margaret R. Bryant,
Employer Participation Committees: "Sham Unions" or Wave of the Future?,
LEG. TIMES,

Dec. 13, 1993, at 25.

263. See GOULD, supra note 10, at 262.

